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INTRODUCTION 
On November 2, 2010, over a quarter million Alaskans cast their ballots for 
various offices, including United States Senator.1 The hotly contested election 
involved incumbent Lisa Murkowski, who had lost the Republican primary but was 
running a vigorous write-in campaign, Republican and Tea Party favorite Joe 
Miller, and Democrat Scott McAdams.2 An initial count of the votes demonstrated 
that approximately 40% of voters had written in a candidate, over 35% had voted 
                                                                                                             
 
 † Copyright © Joshua A. Douglas 2013. 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This Article 
was named a winner of the 2011–2012 SEALS Call for Papers. The Article benefitted 
greatly from comments I received at the Fourth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts 
Workshop and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) New Scholars 
Workshop. Special thanks to Ned Foley, Rick Hasen, Justin Levitt, Michael Kang, Mike 
Pitts, Lori Ringhand, and Michael Solimine for providing invaluable insights on prior 
drafts. Thanks also to Beau Steenken for extremely helpful library assistance and to Colin 
Bruckel, Matt Hassen, and Kyle Hermanson for excellent research assistance. Finally, 
thanks to the editors and staff of the Indiana Law Journal for helping to polish this Article. 
 1. ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, STATE OF ALASKA 2010 GENERAL ELECTION: 
NOVEMBER 2, 2010 OFFICIAL RESULTS (2010), available at 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/10GENR/data/results.htm. 
 2. See Sean Cockerham & Erika Bolstad, Murkowski Says “Let’s Make History,” 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2010), 
http://www.adn.com/2010/09/17/1459578/murkowski-expected-to-say-yes.html. 
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for Miller, and over 23% had voted for McAdams.3 If, as was expected, most of the 
write-in votes went to Murkowski, then she would retain her Senate seat.4 
Although it became clear fairly soon after Election Day that Murkowski had 
received many more votes than Miller, Miller still refused to concede the election.5 
Instead, he turned to the courts6—a destination for many close elections.7 Miller 
argued that a large number of the write-in votes for Murkowski were invalid, 
particularly if the voters had misspelled her name.8 Miller finally conceded almost 
two months after Election Day, after he lost before both the Alaska Supreme Court 
and the federal district court.9 
Alaska, like all other states,10 has a specific, adjudicative procedure for election 
contests, or post-election disputes about the true winner of the election. Under 
Alaska’s election contest provision, a losing candidate may bring a lawsuit 
challenging the election results in the superior court within ten days after the 
completion of the state’s review of the election and may appeal the decision to the 
state supreme court.11 Other states have even more detailed provisions. For 
example, Norm Coleman, the losing candidate in the 2008 U.S. Senate election in 
Minnesota, had to follow a statutorily-prescribed process in bringing a lawsuit to 
contest the election of Al Franken.12 Minnesota’s election contest provisions place 
a strict time limit on the filing of an election contest and the location of filing.13 
The case is heard before a special court of three judges assigned by the chief justice 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.14 The three-judge court’s decision is appealable 
directly to the supreme court (thus skipping the intermediate court of appeals level), 
and the appeal must take precedence over all other matters before the state supreme 
court.15 
                                                                                                             
 
 3. ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1. 
 4. See Sandhya Somashekhar, In Alaska, the Final Countdown, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 
2010, at A01. 
 5. Sandhya Somashekhar, Despite Alaska Senate Race Results, Joe Miller Presses on 
in Principle, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112702896.html. 
 6. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. Miller, 245 P.3d at 869. 
 9. Becky Bohrer, Miller Ending Legal Battle, Conceding Senate Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Jan. 1, 2011), https://advance.lexis.com/GoToContentView?requestid=1f93f35b-8220-46fd-
bbd6-84646d2e72af; see Miller v. Treadwell, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Alaska 2010) (raising 
federal constitutional issues); Miller, 245 P.3d at 867.  
 10. See infra Part I.  
 11. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20.540, .550 (2010). 
 12. See Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 456 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam). For a 
detailed discussion of the Coleman-Franken dispute, see Edward B. Foley, The Lake 
Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129 
(2011) [hereinafter Foley, Lake Wobegone Recount]. 
 13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.021 (West 2009) (providing that a contester must file an 
election contest within seven days of a general election with the court administrator of the 
District Court in Ramsey County). 
 14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009). 
 15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10(4) (West 2009) (providing that “[t]he appeal from an 
election contest relating to the office of state senator or representative takes precedence over 
all other matters before the Supreme Court”). 
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State legislatures recognize that cases involving election contests are different 
from normal legal disputes. A decision maker must determine the winner of an 
election; in other words, a court or other tribunal will decide who will enact laws 
under which the state’s residents are governed. Election contest cases therefore play 
a fundamental role in shaping our democracy. As a result, state legislatures have 
acknowledged the uniqueness of post-election disputes by enacting specific 
provisions for election contests.16  
This Article uncovers the different mechanisms states use to resolve election 
contests. One universal rule regarding post-election disputes is that “[t]here is no 
common law basis for election challenges.”17 As the Iowa Supreme Court 
explained, “[t]he right to contest an election is only conferred by statute, and 
contestants must strictly comply with the provisions of the statute in order to confer 
jurisdiction. Thus, contestants are limited to the scheme provided by the 
legislature.”18 An inquiry into election contests therefore entails a survey of state 
election statutes and constitutions.19 Although it is possible that parties may file in 
federal court and raise federal constitutional issues to challenge an election, 
election contests are typically the province of state law.20 This Article provides the 
first comprehensive analysis of existing state election codes regarding the 
procedures for election contests. 
In analyzing election contest procedures among the fifty states, the main trend 
that emerges is a lack of uniformity in how states decide disputed elections. Some 
states have multi-tiered processes involving many judges, while others leave the 
decision up to a single body without possibility of appeal. Some states seem to 
value quick decision making through their statutes, while others elevate the virtues 
of robust review or the prevention of ideological bias. Understanding the myriad 
processes currently on the books is vital to evaluating current procedures for 
                                                                                                             
 
 16. Election contest procedures are not unique to the United States. For example, the English 
High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) recently voided the election results for a member 
of parliament after the losing candidate brought an election contest, alleging that the winning 
candidate had “published several false statements of fact in relation to the [losing candidate’s] 
personal character or conduct which he had no reasonable grounds for believing to be true and did 
not believe to be true.” See Watkins v. Woolas, [2010] EWHC (Q.B.) 2702, [3] (Eng.), available 
at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/2702.html. 
 17. BARRY H. WEINBERG, THE RESOLUTION OF ELECTION DISPUTES: LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
THAT CONTROL ELECTION CHALLENGES 1 (2d ed. 2008); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Counts, 
Recounts, and Election Contests: Lessons From the Florida Presidential Election, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 425, 431 (2001). 
 18. Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 2007) (citation 
omitted); see also Taylor v. Roche, 248 S.E.2d 580, 582 (S.C. 1978) (“The right to contest 
an election exists only under the constitutional and statutory provisions, and the procedure 
proscribed by statute must be strictly followed.”). 
 19. The appendix summarizes the various procedures for election contests by state and 
type of election. 
 20. See Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud, 
Learning From Florida’s Presidential Election Debacle, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 159, 192 (2001) 
(“Arguably, Congress has not adopted laws addressing persistent flaws in the election 
process because such election contests have always been a matter of state law.”). Professor 
Lee advocates for the broader use of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
to fill the gap of state laws that have deficient election contest provisions. See id. at 192–214. 
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resolving post-election disputes and deciding what aspects of the provisions are 
most in need of reform. 
The analysis of current election contest mechanisms leads to two conclusions for 
moving forward. First, every state should, at a minimum, ensure that their methods 
for resolving election contests are tied to defined goals, such as minimizing 
ideological decision making, fostering timely resolution, and promoting clarity in 
the resolution process. Second, and most lacking under the current regimes, states 
should make certain that they appoint a neutral, unbiased decision maker to resolve 
all election contests. This Article provides several models and discusses the key 
considerations states should contemplate in creating an impartial election contest 
tribunal. 
A quick word on terminology is important before embarking on this discussion. 
An “election contest” occurs once the election goes past the regular administrative 
procedures of counting the votes and conducting a recount.21 That is, an election 
contest is remedial in nature, in which a losing candidate seeks to have the certified 
result overturned because of an election irregularity.22 The various provisions for 
automatic or requested recounts are beyond the scope of this Article.23 I am instead 
focusing on what happens when an election moves past the recount stage and goes 
to an adjudicatory election contest procedure. Additionally, although parties may 
raise federal constitutional issues such as equal protection or due process should 
they exist in a post-election lawsuit—and might do so in federal court either 
simultaneously or sequentially with a state case24—the focus of this Article is on 
the state-created statutory mechanisms for resolving election contests. 
Part I describes, for various types of elections, the procedures states have 
enacted to resolve election contests. This Part analyzes state election contest 
provisions for state representatives, governor and lieutenant governor, judges (for 
those states that have elected judiciaries), members of Congress, and presidential 
electors. Part II reveals the various trends that emerge from the different ways 
states handle election contests, focusing on statutory deadlines, specific procedural 
details, and the appeals process. Part III begins the discussion of what factors 
should inform state election contest procedures. This Part calls on states to evaluate 
their election contest provisions, with a specific focus on timing concerns and the 
elimination of ideology or partisanship in the decision maker. In particular, this 
Part offers one possible mechanism to minimize ideological decision making: the 
creation of a five-member election contest tribunal with two “partisans” and three 
“neutrals,” as well as a diversity of expertise among the panel members. Further, by 
examining several factors that can help to eliminate, or at least balance, bias in who 
                                                                                                             
 
 21. See Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 
278–79 (2007) (explaining the difference between a recount and an election contest). 
 22. See id. at 278–79. 
 23. For a summary of each state’s recount process, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless 
Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1817–36 
(2005). 
 24. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 228 (6th Cir. 
2011) (analyzing federal equal protection issues even though the parties also were litigating 
in the Supreme Court of Ohio). 
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decides an election contest, this Part provides a starting point for a discussion of 
best practices states should consider in reformulating their election contest statutes. 
I. ELECTION CONTESTS BY TYPE OF ELECTION 
One mechanism for decoding the myriad state election contest statutes is to 
group them by type of election. Indeed, many state contest provisions depend on 
the specific office involved. This Part will describe the most common election 
contest procedures for state legislative offices, governor and lieutenant governor, 
judicial positions, congressional offices, and presidential electors. Although not 
covering every possible election (such as referenda, municipal elections, or 
primaries25), this Part will describe election contest procedures for the most salient 
and highly visible elections and the ones that are likely to impact the most people. 
Public interest in election contests for these offices is likely to be substantial, 
making it important to understand the procedures by which tribunals decide these 
disputes. What emerges is a multitude of different processes and procedures, with 
surprisingly little consistency among the states. Breaking down the categories by 
type of election contest, however, demonstrates various trends in how states handle 
post-election challenges. States can use this data to rethink their own approaches to 
disputed elections.26 
A. Election Contests Involving State Legislative Offices 
By far, the most common mechanism states use for resolving contests for state 
house and senate seats is to leave the matter to each respective house in the 
legislature. Indeed, virtually all state constitutions, much like the U.S. Constitution, 
provide that each house shall be the “judge of” its members’ “qualifications, 
elections and returns.”27 Allowing each house to judge the elections of its members 
                                                                                                             
 
 25. Many states do not separate election contest provisions for municipal offices or 
primaries from the general election contest statute. The states that mention these elections 
typically follow the same general procedure as for other offices. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-
16-56 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that the circuit court hears election contests for 
municipal offices); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801 (2011) (same); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16100, 
16101 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (stipulating rules for contesting primary elections, which 
are roughly the same as for general election contests). The extent of any differences for these 
lower-profile elections is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 26. In many ways, this compilation is a follow-up to a 1978 report by the National 
Clearinghouse on Election Administration, Federal Election Commission. See INST. FOR 
RESEARCH IN PUB. SAFETY, SCH. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, IND. UNIV., AN ANALYSIS OF 
LAWS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND RECOUNTS: FINAL REPORT, 
VOL. II: THE STATE PERSPECTIVE (1978). That publication, while outdated, presents a general 
synopsis of both the recount and contest procedures in all fifty states. This Article, while 
obviously providing an updated account, also goes further, synthesizing the various election 
contest regimes to identify the main trends among the states. It also offers a unique 
perspective on the kind of tribunal that is best suited to resolve election contests. See infra 
Part III. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 51; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12; 
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5; COLO. 
CONST. art. V, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. III, 
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is one aspect of legislative sovereignty.28 Accordingly, all but two states allow only 
its own members ultimately to resolve a contested election to that body.29 
Several states, however, still invoke judicial processes in deciding legislative 
election contests even when giving the respective body of the legislature the final 
say.30 For instance, Kansas statutes specifically require courts to play a role in the 
                                                                                                             
§ 2; GA. CONST. art. III, § 4, para. 7; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 9; 
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 10; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 7; KAN. CONST. 
art. II, § 8; KY. CONST. § 38; LA. CONST. art. III, § 7; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 3; MD. 
CONST. art. III, § 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, §§ II, art. IV, III, art. X; MICH. CONST. art. 
IV, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 38; MO. CONST. art. III, § 18; 
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.H. CONST. 
pt. II, arts. 22, 35; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 2; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.Y. CONST. 
art. III, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 20; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 30; 
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 11; PA. CONST. art. II, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. III, 
§ 11; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 8; UTAH 
CONST. art. VI, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 14, 19; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WASH. CONST. 
art. II, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 10. 
 28. See, e.g., Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Pierre Pressure: Legislative Elections, the State 
Constitution, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota, 50 S.D. L. REV. 218, 242 (2005) 
(describing the legislature’s authority over election contests for legislative seats as “a 
sovereign power that may not be constitutionally delegated to or shared with the courts”). 
Paul Salamanca and James Keller offer three historical and theoretical reasons why most 
states give legislatures the authority to judge the elections of their own members: the 
conceptual relationship between legislative independence and legislative privilege, the 
connection between control of a legislature’s membership and its independence among the 
branches of government, and tradition in allowing legislatures to seat members whom the 
voters choose even if the members do not meet the precise qualifications for service. See 
Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications, 
Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J. 241, 255 (2006–07). 
 29. North Dakota and Hawaii are the lone exceptions. North Dakota’s Constitution 
provides, “[e]ach house is the judge of the qualifications of its members, but election 
contests are subject to judicial review as provided by law.” N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 12. In 
1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that then-current North Dakota law manifested 
the legislature’s intent that, notwithstanding the Constitutional provision, only the legislature 
could hear legislative-election contests. Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260, 263 (N.D. 
1987). In response, the legislature passed the current version of the election contest statute, 
which provides, “[l]egislative election contests must be determined in court as provided in 
this chapter for other contests. No legislative election may be contested before either house 
of the legislative assembly.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-10 (2009). 
  Hawaii’s Constitution provides both that “[e]ach house shall be the judge of the 
elections, returns and qualifications of its own members,” HAW. CONST. art. III, § 12, and 
that “[c]ontested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such 
manner as shall be provided by law,” HAW. CONST. art. II, § 10. In 1969, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court reconciled these seemingly contradictory clauses by ruling that the state’s 
courts must resolve election contests for state legislature and that under article III, section 
12, “the House’s function in judging the elections of its members extends only to 
ascertaining whether the Constitution has been complied with; that is, whether the parties 
have properly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest.” Akizaki v. 
Fong, 461 P.2d 221, 223 (Haw. 1969) (emphasis omitted). Hawaii’s statutes provide that all 
election contests originate in the state’s supreme court. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-172 (West 
2008). 
 30. Oregon’s election law statutes provide that a plaintiff can bring a contest in the 
circuit court to contest the election of a state senator or representative. OR. REV. STAT. § 
258.036(1)(b) (2011). However, the Oregon Constitution provides that “[e]ach house when 
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fact-finding process.31 To initiate an election contest, the challenger must file a 
notice with the district court clerk, who submits a copy to the chief justice of the 
state supreme court.32 The chief justice then provides both parties with a list of the 
district court judges whose districts comprise the entirety or part of the contested 
legislative district.33 If there is more than one judge that falls within the legislative 
district, the parties alternate striking the names of the judges until only one 
remains.34 That judge, applying the rules of evidence for civil actions, makes 
findings of fact solely as to what number of legally-cast votes each of the 
candidates received.35 The district judge then transmits his or her findings to the 
appropriate house, which convenes a committee to report to the full house.36 The 
full house decides which candidate is the winner.37 No appeal is permissible, either 
of the district judge’s findings of fact or of the house’s final determination, 
meaning that the district judge has complete discretion on the factual findings but 
that the house has the ultimate say on who won the election and could even 
disregard the district court’s ruling.38  
Other states have similar mechanisms for allowing courts to render decisions on 
election contests while preserving the legislature’s constitutional role in deciding 
the election of its own members. For example, in both Minnesota and Ohio, the 
courts make a final decision on the election contest and then transmit that 
determination to the appropriate house for its consideration.39 In Pennsylvania, the 
                                                                                                             
assembled, shall choose its own officers, judge of the election, qualifications, and returns of 
its own members.” OR. CONST. art. IV, § 11. The Oregon courts have not been asked to 
invalidate the conflicting portion of the election contest statute, although the Oregon 
Supreme Court has held that “the constitution does vest the sole jurisdiction of this contest 
[for election of a state representative] to be within the House of Representatives of the 
Legislative Assembly.” Combs v. Groener, 472 P.2d 281, 283 (Or. 1970). It would seem, 
therefore, that if presented with the question the Oregon Supreme Court would invalidate the 
portion of section 258.036(1)(b) that permits judicial election contests for state 
representatives and senators, although it would still allow contests for primary elections for 
these seats. See id. at 283 (“There is justification for a distinction between a primary and 
general election contest. The primary election does not make the winner of that election a 
member of the legislative assembly. It is no more than a form of party nomination. It is not 
the exclusive process for getting an aspirant’s name on the general election ballot.”). 
 31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1442 (2000). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1451 (2000). 
 36. § 25-1451. 
 37. Id. 
 38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450 (2000). 
 39. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.14 
(LexisNexis 2012). In Minnesota, the district court decides the election contest by issuing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are appealable to the supreme court. The 
district court, or the supreme court if the case is appealed, must then transmit the findings to 
the appropriate house, which conducts a hearing and makes a final, unappealable decision. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10. A judge in Ohio renders a decision on the election contest but 
then transmits that decision to the appropriate House for it to decide the election of its own 
members. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.14. Other states give the fact-finding power to a 
separate commission. In Arkansas, for example, those wishing to contest an election to the 
house of representatives must file a complaint with the Arkansas State Claims Commission, 
which makes a nonbinding recommendation to the house of representatives on how to 
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court of common pleas of the county in which the winner resides tries and 
determines the election contest, but any claimant to the seat can present a petition 
challenging the court’s decision to the proper house for a final resolution of the 
contest.40 New Hampshire has a bipartisan Ballot Law Commission decide appeals 
of recounts for state legislative offices, but no further appeal of the commission’s 
decision is permitted “in view of the constitutional provision[] vesting in . . . both 
houses of the general court exclusive jurisdiction over the elections and 
qualifications of their respective members.”41 
Sometimes a state’s judiciary may insert itself into a legislative election contest. 
In Stephenson v. Woodward, the Kentucky Supreme Court overruled the Kentucky 
Senate’s resolution affirming a sitting member’s qualifications for service, ousting 
the member from office.42 The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute because it was not technically an “election contest” but instead a challenge 
to the qualifications of one of the candidates to appear on the ballot.43 
Commentators, however, lambasted the “extraordinary” decision as contradicting 
the explicit text of the Kentucky Constitution, which gives the legislature the 
authority to resolve election contests for its own members.44 This decision 
exemplifies the difficulty inherent in an election contest regime in which an 
institution narrowly reads the governing language vesting jurisdiction in another 
body so as to retain authority for itself. 
Thus, for state legislative contests in virtually all states, each respective house 
has the final say in the election of its own members. In many states, however, 
courts play a major role in this process. Indeed, some state courts render decisions 
on the ultimate outcome and then transmit these findings to the house. In this way, 
the house can maintain its sovereign role of determining the election of its own 
members, although it does so with the backdrop of a judicial decision on the issue. 
Of course, a house that makes a decision contrary to the court’s recommendation 
might appear to be acting solely along partisan lines. This might affect its 
legitimacy and, therefore, would suggest that the house should simply adopt the 
judiciary’s determination.45 In many situations, then, the court’s decision would 
seem likely to have an extremely strong influence on the house’s resolution of the 
contest. The contrary, however, is also true: if the majority party has only a slim 
lead in the chamber, it might seek to seat its ideological ally to bolster its hold as 
the majority party regardless of what the court recommends. It is this concern of 
partisanship and entrenchment that counsels toward using impartial decision 
makers for election contests, as discussed below.46 
In sum, virtually all states delegate to the legislative branch the power to 
determine the election of its own members when a dispute arises. Some states, 
however, augment this legislative authority with a significant role for the judiciary. 
                                                                                                             
resolve the dispute. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 7-5-805(b)(1)(D)(2) (2011). 
 40. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3401-3409 (West 2007). 
 41. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:8(II), :16 (2008). 
 42. 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005). 
 43. Id. at 167–68. 
 44. Salamanca & Keller, supra note 28, at 243–44. 
 45. See Parsons, Jr., supra note 28, at 234 (“The inherent political pressure placed upon 
the Legislature by the supreme court’s announcement that a particular candidate has, in its 
view, won a disputed election should be readily obvious to all.”). 
 46. See infra Part III. 
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B. Election Contests Involving Governor and Lieutenant Governor 
State processes for election contests involving the state’s chief executives vary 
considerably. Some states involve the legislature heavily, others leave the decision 
up to the judiciary, and some have special committees decide the dispute. 
Additionally, certain states provide for several levels of appeal, while other states 
allow no appeals at all. 
1. Trial-Level Court Decides 
The most common procedure states use for election contests for governor and 
lieutenant governor is to permit the losing candidate to file suit in the trial court of 
general jurisdiction, usually with an appeal allowable to either the court of appeals 
or directly to the supreme court. Eighteen states provide that a party seeking to 
contest an election result must file in the trial court.47 A nineteenth state, 
Oklahoma, allows a party to file in the trial court but also grants jurisdiction over 
contests to the appropriate election board.48 In these states, a party wishing to 
challenge the election must simply file the suit in the normal trial court, albeit 
sometimes within strict time guidelines. 
                                                                                                             
 
 47. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.550 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672(B) (2006); CAL. 
ELEC. CODE § 16400 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-324 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 102.168 (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1403 (2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 35 (LexisNexis 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
36-103 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:29-2 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-
16-04 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-403 
(LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2002 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
9.01(6) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-102 (2011). Note that some state 
constitutions purportedly give the power to decide election contests to the legislature, but the 
legislature has enacted statutes delegating that power to the courts. For example, Oregon’s 
Constitution states, “Contested Elections for Governor shall be determined by the Legislative 
Assembly in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” OR. CONST. art. V, § 6. 
Nevertheless, the legislature has enacted a judicial election contest regime that specifically 
includes gubernatorial elections.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036. 
  Some states have different rules for primary contests involving gubernatorial 
elections. For example, in Mississippi, the State Executive Committee initially decides the 
contest. Judicial review is available from a special tribunal composed of the members of the 
original committee and a circuit court judge whom the chief justice of the supreme court 
designates, with the circuit judge acting as the sole decision maker. That judge’s decision is 
appealable to the supreme court, which may review the findings of fact only if the 
commissioners on the State Executive Committee were not unanimous or at least three of 
them did not attend the hearing with the circuit judge. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-923, -927 
to -933, -937 (West 2003). 
 48. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 8-109 (West 1997) (A challenger may “contest the 
correctness of the announced results of said election by filing a written petition with the 
appropriate election board. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any 
proceedings in district court, which are otherwise authorized by law, alleging irregularities or 
fraud in an election.”). 
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Of the states that give a trial court jurisdiction to decide the dispute, four allow 
an appeal directly to the state supreme court.49 By contrast, fourteen states’ statutes 
either have no specific guidance regarding an appeal or provide that an appeal of an 
election contest lies with the next-highest court in the state’s system or proceeds 
like any other civil case.50 The final state in this group of nineteen, Louisiana, 
provides that a direct appeal lies to the court of appeals sitting en banc.51 
Two states—Michigan and New York—do not have separate election code 
provisions discussing election contests, but each state provides a remedy of quo 
warranto, which ultimately serves the same function by requiring the ouster of a 
candidate who has already taken office but then loses a post-election challenge.52 
Historically, quo warranto actions were the common law mechanism to contest an 
election.53 Most states in the nineteenth century modernized their election contest 
provisions by enacting statutes to replace the common law quo warranto 
proceeding.54 Michigan and New York, however, retained and codified quo 
                                                                                                             
 
 49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-325 (West 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 59 
(LexisNexis 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-5 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-09 
(2009). 
 50. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20.540–.560 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-671 to -678 
(2006); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 16900 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN § 102.168; GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 21-2-528 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-36-101 to -104 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-
1117 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-11 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 
§ 8-109; OR. REV. STAT. § 258.085 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-406 (LexisNexis 
2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2617 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(9) (West 2004); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-17-101 to -114 (2011). 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(H); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006) (providing for direct 
appeal to the circuit court sitting en banc for nonfrivolous constitutional questions regarding 
the Federal Election Campaign Act). 
 52. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501 (West 1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b 
(McKinney 2010). Florida has a specific election contest provision but also allows for ouster 
via quo warranto as another possible remedy. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.1682, .169; see Bailey v. 
Davis, 273 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (suggesting that a challenger may 
initiate a quo warranto action even after he or she lost the election contest). 
 53. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Just How Settled Are the Legal Principles that Control 
Election Disputes?, 8 ELECTION L.J. 233, 235–36, 235 n.8 (2009); Lee, supra note 20, at 183 
(“Prior to the adoption of statutory election contest provisions, the primary methods of 
contesting elections were quo warranto and mandamus actions, common law actions to test 
the validity of an election and compel the performance of a duty, respectively.”); see 
generally GEORGE W. MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS 279–
429 (4th ed. 1897). 
 54. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral 
Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2004) (explaining that “throughout the 
nineteenth century, legislatures sought to modernize election challenges by creating election 
contest laws to supplement quo warranto actions”). As Professor Foley explains,  
[t]he most important early use of quo warranto in the United States to challenge 
an incumbent governor’s reelection based on wrongdoing in the counting of 
ballots occurred in Wisconsin’s gubernatorial election of 1855. This Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decision, which ordered the incumbent governor to vacate his 
office because he was not the rightful winner of the election, is considered the 
Marbury v. Madison of Wisconsin law.  
Edward B. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore:  The 1792 Election Dispute and its 
Continuing Relevance, 44 IND. L. REV. 23, 31 n.54 (2010) [hereinafter Foley, The Founders’ 
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warranto as the means to contest an election. The theory behind a quo warranto 
action is that the candidate declared the winner has “usurped” the office.55 The 
losing candidate therefore must ask the attorney general to initiate an investigation 
into whether the winner has “usurped” the elected position.56 The attorney general 
screens the case and has the discretion to decide whether to bring a quo warranto 
judicial action seeking to “oust” the winner from office.57 In Michigan, if the 
attorney general refuses to act a private party may bring suit,58 but in New York the 
attorney general has complete discretion as to whether to proceed, and the quo 
warranto action is the sole mechanism to challenge the election.59 The “usurper” 
may suffer a penalty for taking the office: in both Michigan and New York, if a 
court rules in favor of the losing candidate, the “usurper” is subject to a $2000 
fine.60 
Given the theoretical underpinning of a quo warranto action—that the purported 
winner has “usurped” the position—the attorney general may not initiate the 
proceeding until that person has assumed office. One virtue of this process is that 
there will always be someone in office during the pendency of an election 
challenge, which is often a drawn out affair.61 Then again, that person may not be a 
legitimate office holder. Whether it is better to have someone illegitimately in 
office to perform governmental functions or to leave the office vacant is a 
normative question that Michigan and New York have resolved in favor of having 
someone in office.62 
Finally, two states—Kansas and Minnesota—require the supreme court to 
appoint a special three-judge trial court to consider the evidence and decide the 
election contest.63 Appeal lies directly to the supreme court.64 
Most states that have a trial-level judge initially hear the dispute do not specify 
the manner of selecting that judge. New Jersey, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin 
are slightly different: in New Jersey65 and Wisconsin,66 the chief justice of the 
                                                                                                             
Bush v. Gore] (citations omitted). 
 55. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b; Delgado v. Sunderland, 767 N.E.2d 662, 665 (N.Y. 
2002). 
 56. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(1). 
 57. Id. 
 58. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501 (West 1996). 
 59. Delgado, 767 N.E.2d at 665. 
 60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4515; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(3). New York also 
subjects the usurper to arrest. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(2). 
 61. Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 301 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 62. Not all states leave the office vacant during an election challenge. For example, in 
2004, Christine Gregiore assumed the governorship of Washington even while the election 
contest proceeded. See In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 811 (Wash. 2006).   
 63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009); see 
Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 
2009).  This is analogous to the federal provision that authorizes a three-judge district court 
to hear certain election law cases, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Joshua 
A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433, 
455–56 [hereinafter Douglas, Procedure of Election Law]. 
 64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.09(2), .10(4) (West 
2009). 
 65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-2 (West 1999). 
 66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(6) (West 2004). 
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supreme court selects the judge to hear the case; in Oklahoma, the supreme court as 
a whole may assign a judge to hear the contest;67 and in Utah, the chief judge of the 
district court chooses the judge.68  
Georgia has the most detailed provisions for selecting the initial trial judge. The 
challenger must file the contest in the superior court of the county in which the 
defendant resides.69 Georgia’s confusingly-worded statute then directs the clerk of 
that court to have an administrative judge select a superior court judge to hear the 
case.70 However, a different administrative judge must make the selection if the 
initial administrative judge resides in the same circuit in which the contest will 
proceed.71 Ultimately, Georgia’s procedure ensures that a judge of the district 
(larger-level unit) but not the circuit (smaller-level unit) presides over the dispute, 
which is likely to increase the possibility that the judge will be a neutral arbiter. 
2. State Legislature Decides 
The second most common procedure for deciding election contests for governor 
and lieutenant governor is to have the full legislature determine the proper winner. 
Thirteen states use this process.72 In these states there is no possibility of appeal; 
the legislature has the final say in who won the election.73 There are also few 
                                                                                                             
 
 67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 8-119, -120 (West 1997). 
 68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-404(1)(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 69. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523(a) (2008). 
 70. § 21-2-523(c). Georgia’s Superior Court, its court of general jurisdiction, is divided 
into ten judicial districts. Each judicial district includes between one and eight judicial 
circuits, corresponding to the counties within the district, for a total of forty-nine judicial 
circuits within the ten judicial districts. Learn About Your Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS OF GEORGIA, http://www.georgiacourts.org/index.php/component/content/ 
article/116. 
 71. § 21-2-523(d).  
 72. Twelve states require a joint session of the full legislature to decide the contest, 
while a thirteenth, Mississippi, directs only its house to resolve the dispute. MD. CONST. art. 
II, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. V, § 140; ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis 2007); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 7-5-806 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-205 to -207 (West 2009); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 34-2104 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205(5) (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 293.433(1) (LexisNexis 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-182.13A(a) (West 2007); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-18-101 (2003); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.002(b) (West 2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 24.2-804 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-2 (LexisNexis 2011).  
  A fourteenth state, Indiana, has seemingly contradictory provisions regarding 
gubernatorial election contests. The Indiana Constitution provides that “[c]ontested elections 
for Governor or Lieutenant Governor, shall be determined by the General Assembly, in such 
manner as may be prescribed by law.” IND. CONST. art. V, § 6. Indiana, however, does not 
have a law on the books describing such a procedure regarding how the General Assembly is 
to resolve a gubernatorial election contest. Indiana law does provide that the State Recount 
Commission, an administrative body, “shall conduct contest proceedings . . . resulting from 
. . . an election for a federal, state, or legislative office,” which presumably includes 
governor. IND. CODE § 3-12-10-4(b) (2005). It is unclear whether this delegation to the State 
Recount Commission satisfies the constitutional mandate that the General Assembly resolves 
election contests. See also supra note 47 (discussing a similar contradiction in Oregon’s 
statutes). 
 73. MD. CONST. art. II, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. V, §§ 128, 140; ALA. CODE § 17-16-65; 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-806; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-205 to -207; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-
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procedural specifications for the process by which the legislature is to decide the 
dispute. Some states, however, ask a special committee of the legislature to hear 
testimony and prepare a report for the full legislature to consider. For example, in 
Kentucky, the senate randomly selects three of its members and the house chooses 
eight of its members to serve as an eleven-member board to make an initial 
assessment of the contest and report its findings to the full legislature.74 Similarly, 
the Tennessee Speaker of the House appoints seven members—not more than four 
of whom may belong to the same political party—and the speaker of the senate 
appoints five members—not more than three of whom may belong to the same 
political party—to serve as a “Committee on the Governor’s Election” to take 
evidence and hear objections.75 
Three states—Delaware,76 Iowa,77 and Pennsylvania78—use a special committee 
comprised of select members of the legislature to decide the contest without ever 
involving the full legislature. Delaware’s Constitution provides that each house 
must choose one-third of its members by ballot to serve on the contest committee, 
and the chief justice of the supreme court or, in his or her absence, the chancellor, 
shall preside and rule on the admissibility of evidence and other legal questions.79 
In Iowa, each house selects seven of its members randomly to serve on the “contest 
court.”80 The statute does not specify what happens if there is a seven-to-seven tie. 
Iowa’s administrative regulations, however, do state that if the election contest 
court finds that there were errors in the conduct of an election that make it 
impossible to determine a winner, the state commissioner of elections must invoke 
its emergency powers to order a repeat election.81 It is unclear whether a seven-to-
seven tie would constitute an “election contest emergency” under the regulations. 
Pennsylvania’s process is much more complicated and interesting.82 Within five 
days after receiving a petition contesting the election (signed by at least 100 
registered voters), the senate and house must convene to choose a “select 
committee” of thirteen members.83 The process is two-tiered: The senate first 
selects twelve members and the house twenty-five members through a highly 
specific process. For the senate, the names of each senator are written on “distinct 
pieces of paper as nearly alike as may be, each of which shall be rolled up and put 
into a box by the clerk of the house of representatives and placed on the speaker’s 
table.”84 The secretary of the senate then must “shake[] and intermix[]” the papers, 
draw them out, and put them alternately into three separate boxes on the speaker’s 
                                                                                                             
2104; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205(5); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.433(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
163-182.13A(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-18-101; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.002(b); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 24.2-804; W. VA. CODE § 3-7-2. 
 74. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205. 
 75. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-106, -109 (2003). 
 76. DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 77. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 58.1–.7 (West 2012). 
 78. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3314–20 (West 2007). 
 79. DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 80. IOWA CODE § 58.4. 
 81. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 721-21.1(47)(21.1)(14) (2012). 
 82. For a general overview of Pennsylvania’s post-election litigation procedures, see 
Clifford B. Levine & David J. Montgomery, Post-Election Litigation in Pennsylvania, 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 153 (2002). 
 83. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3314, 3315 (West 2007). 
 84. § 3314(a) (punctuation omitted). 
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table.85 The clerk of the house then must “shake and intermix” the three boxes and 
draw twelve names alternately from each box.86 Presumably, the three boxes are 
meant to increase the random nature of the selection process. The house uses the 
same process to select its initial twenty-five members, with the secretary of the 
senate and the clerk of the house switching their administrative and selection 
duties.87 Either of the parties to the contest can object to a selected member, which 
requires the selection of a new member to the initial pool, but no further objections 
are allowed if there are no remaining names in the boxes to take the challenged 
member’s place.88 The clerk of the house and the secretary of the senate each then 
draws the remaining names from the other chamber’s boxes and reads them aloud 
to ensure there have been no mistakes or unfairness in the process so far.89 
Once the legislature has selected its initial thirty-seven members, further 
winnowing occurs: the parties to the election contest receive the names of the 
twelve senators and twenty-five representatives, retire to an “adjoining” room, and, 
in the presence of “a clerk or members appointed by the joint vote of members 
present,” alternately strike off the names on each list until there are four members 
of the senate and nine members of the house remaining.90 The parties have only one 
hour to complete this process.91 The list of thirteen legislators serves as the final 
“select committee” to decide the dispute.92 The select committee must meet within 
forty-eight hours after its appointment to begin the proceedings.93 The chief justice 
of the supreme court serves as the select committee’s presiding officer, who 
decides questions regarding the admissibility of evidence and must “pronounce his 
opinion upon other questions of law involved in the contest, but he shall not have a 
vote on the final determination of the case.”94 Demonstrating the antiquated yet 
charming nature of the statutory scheme, all witnesses that the special committee 
subpoenas are entitled to “six cents for every mile of the distance necessarily 
traveled by him in coming to and returning from the place of trial, and shall also be 
allowed the sum of two dollars and fifty cents for every day he may be detained at 
the place of such trial.”95  
The current version of this law dates to 1937.96 However, the 1937 law is largely 
identical to the provision from 1874 that formalized these procedures.97 Although 
                                                                                                             
 
 85. § 3314(b). 
 86. § 3314(c). 
 87. § 3315. 
 88. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3316 (West 2007). 
 89. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3317 (West 2007). 
 90. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3318 (West 2007). 
 91. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3320 (West 2007). The statute makes no mention of 
what happens if the parties fail to finalize the list within the hour. However, the members of 
each house may not leave the “conference room” where the initial process took place 
“without permission” until the select committee is finalized. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3319 (West 2007). 
 92. § 3320. 
 93. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3321 (West 2007). 
 94. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3324 (West 2007). 
 95. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3330 (West 2007). The Pennsylvania legislature has not 
updated this law since its enactment to increase the amount of compensation witnesses 
receive. 
 96. Pennsylvania Election Code, No. 320, art. XVII, §§ 1712–1730, 1937 Pa. Laws 
1333, 1468–73. 
 97. Act of May 19, 1874, No. 136, 1874 Pa. Laws 208. 
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the legislative history is not entirely clear, it appears that Senator Harry White 
introduced the gubernatorial contest provisions as an amendment98 to an existing 
house bill regarding election contests.99  
It is possible that Senator White thought the detailed procedures necessary in 
light of a political scandal in Texas involving that state’s gubernatorial election of 
1873.100 As part of the Coke-Davis election dispute, the Texas Supreme Court 
issued a decision in Ex parte Rodriguez, often referred to as the “semicolon case,” 
in which the court rendered the general election unconstitutional.101 The Texas 
Supreme Court determined that the election was illegal because it was held under 
an unconstitutional law, the interpretation of which turned on the placement of a 
semicolon in the section of the Texas Constitution that delineated election 
procedures.102 This was controversial because the original election results showed a 
huge victory for Democrat Richard Coke over incumbent Governor Edmund J. 
Davis.103 Davis had appointed all three members of the Texas Supreme Court.104 
Thus, the decision was seen as a simple power-grabbing maneuver from Davis’s 
partisan supporters on the court so that Davis could remain in office.105 
The decision set off a firestorm, with Coke trying to take office and Davis 
asserting that he instead should remain as governor to give effect to the Texas 
Supreme Court’s decision.106 As Coke and his supporters began to organize a 
legislature for an inauguration and to assume office, Davis asked President Ulysses 
S. Grant to send federal troops to prevent Coke from taking over.107 Eventually, 
after President Grant refused to send troops amid the uncertainty of Davis’s right to 
hold office, Davis succumbed and Coke assumed the governorship.108  
                                                                                                             
 
 98. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, FOR THE 
SESSION BEGUN AT HARRISBURG, ON THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1874 1098 (1874). 
 99. Id. at 1096–98 (citing H.B. 355, 1874 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1874)). 
 100. See Lance A. Cooper, “A Slobbering Lame Thing”?  The Semicolon Case 
Reconsidered, 101 SW. HIST. Q. 320, 320–29 (1998). 
 101. Ex parte Rodriguez, 39 Tex. 705 (1873). 
 102. Cooper, supra note 100, at 323. The section of the Texas Constitution provided: 
“All elections for State, District and County officers shall be held at the county seats of the 
several counties, until otherwise provided by law; and the polls shall be opened for four 
days, from 8 o’clock A.M. until 4 o’clock P.M. of each day.” The Texas legislature, 
however, had passed a law reducing the number of days the polls were to remain open to 
one. Joseph Rodriguez was arrested for voting twice in the election, and he filed a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging that the entire election was void because the law reducing the number 
of polling days was unconstitutional. If the election itself was illegal, he could not have 
committed the crime of voting twice. The Texas Supreme Court agreed, throwing out the 
election results. Id. 
 103. Id. at 321. 
 104. Id. at 325. 
 105. Id. at 321–22 (noting that Democrats viewed the decision as “nothing more than the 
legally indefensible product of partisan judges who were struggling to maintain the 
Republican party’s power and to keep their own jobs,” and that even today “Texas lawyers 
still are warned against citing Rodriguez as precedent and, further, are warned to think twice 
before citing any Semicolon Court opinion”). 
 106. Carl H. Moneyhon, Edmund J. Davis in the Coke-Davis Election Dispute of 1874: A 
Reassessment of Character, 100 SW. HIST. Q. 131, 139–40, 143, 147 (1996). 
 107. Id. at 146–47. 
 108. Id. at 150. 
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The turmoil from Texas involving the state supreme court’s decision in favor of 
the very person who had appointed the justices, combined with the feeling at the 
time that corrupt political machines ran Pennsylvania’s legislature,109 likely led 
Senator White to propose a process for resolving gubernatorial election contests 
that would at least remove explicit partisan taint from the decision-making process. 
That is, Texas’s experience with biased decision makers in the Coke-Davis 
controversy, along with the political climate of Pennsylvania’s legislature, 
counseled for a procedure that would require complete randomness in the selection 
of those who resolved an election contest. Any partisanship in the tribunal would 
be the result of the random selection method. 
Although Senator White’s amendment detailed the specific contours of 
Pennsylvania’s unique process, Senator White’s proposal no doubt originated from 
Pennsylvania’s Constitutional Convention of 1790, which stipulated that a 
committee of the legislature would decide the dispute:  
In case of contested elections, the same shall be judged of and 
determined by a committee to be selected from both houses of the 
legislature, in such manner as shall be by law directed. During the trial 
of contested elections, the speaker of the senate shall exercise the office 
of governor.110 
Pennsylvania has never had an election contest for governor or lieutenant 
governor, so the state has never needed to invoke these processes. It is clear, 
however, that the statute is intended to root out bias or fraud. For example, the 
opposite chamber’s chief administrator—likely a person with very little interest in 
influencing the membership of the special committee—plays a large role in the 
selection process. Moreover, the pulling of names from one box and placement of 
them into three additional boxes contributes to the random nature of the 
proceeding. Ultimately, in light of the political climate at the time, the 
Pennsylvania legislature adopting these provisions must have believed that this sort 
of procedure would best eliminate bias or corruption and would be most fair for all 
involved.  
After the 2012 election, Republicans held a 27–23 majority in the fifty-member 
senate and a 110–93 majority in the 203-member house.111 From a statistical 
                                                                                                             
 
 109. Robert Harrison, The Hornets’ Nest at Harrisburg: A Study of the Pennsylvania 
Legislature in the Late 1870s, 103 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 334, 335–36 (1979). 
 110. FRANCIS SHUNK, THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 
AND 1790, THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 
AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1776, AND THE COUNCIL OF 
CENSORS 370 (1825), available at http://www.duq.edu/Documents/law/pa-
constitution/_pdf/conventions/1776/proceedings1776-1790.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
 111. See Pa. Dep’t of State, 2012 General Election, Unofficial Election Returns, 
Representative in the General Assembly, (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.electionreturns.state.pa.us/ElectionsInformation.aspx?FunctionID=13&ElectionID=53
&OfficeID=13; Pa. Dep’t of State, 2012 General Election, Unofficial Election Returns, Senator in 
the General Assembly, (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.electionreturns.state.pa.us/ElectionsInformation.aspx?FunctionID=13&ElectionID=53
&OfficeID=12; Pugliese Assocs., Pennsylvania Election Results November, 2012 
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perspective, then, Republicans would seem more likely to control a gubernatorial 
election contest because they are more likely to have a majority of members on the 
special committee. However, given that Democrats have a significant number of 
representatives in the General Assembly, it is quite possible that the minority party 
would secure a majority of seats on the special committee based on the random 
draw. Either way, the chances of a complete balance in partisanship on the 
committee are unlikely, meaning that Pennsylvania’s process, while guaranteeing 
randomness and eliminating overt bias such as occurred in the Coke-Davis dispute, 
will still produce a partisan decision maker. The skew of that partisanship will be 
based on the respective numbers in the General Assembly at the time and the luck 
of the draw. 
3. State Supreme Court Decides 
Five states provide that the state’s supreme court has original jurisdiction to 
decide election contests for governor or lieutenant governor, with no possibility of 
appeal.112 In two of these states, however, the supreme court must ask another 
judge for assistance: in Illinois, the supreme court must appoint a circuit judge to 
oversee the hearing or a recount,113 and in Missouri, the supreme court must 
appoint a commissioner of the court to take testimony on points and facts that the 
supreme court specifies.114 
Two states have hybrid approaches that allow their supreme courts to be 
involved from the outset. In Ohio, the chief justice of the supreme court or another 
justice that the chief justice assigns initially hears the election contest.115 A party 
may appeal to the full supreme court.116 Washington’s statutes allow a party to file 
an election contest with the supreme court, court of appeals, or a superior court, 
with possible appeal to the supreme court from a decision of the superior court.117 
                                                                                                             
http://puglieseassociates.com/issues/november-2012-election-summary. 
 112. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-174.5 (West 2008); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a 
(West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 737-A(10) (2008 & Supp. 2011); MO. ANN.  
STAT. § 115.555 (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004). Maine used to send all 
election contests to the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 741–746, enacted by Laws 1985, c. 161, §§ 5, 6, repealed by 
Laws 1993, c. 473, § 34.  After a major ballot tampering scandal during a recount, however, 
Maine repealed its previous election contest law and decided to send all contests besides 
those for state legislature to its supreme court. SPECIAL COMM’N TO REVIEW THE ELECTORAL 
PROCESS, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 7 (1993) (“The Commission believes that 
public confidence in the integrity of the recount process will best be served by having final 
decisions made by the judiciary on direct appeal from the processing of the recount by the 
Secretary of State’s office.”); see Editorial, Election Reform, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, June 14, 
1993, at 6 (“The Maine House is expected to vote today on a wide-ranging election-reform 
bill that makes sensible changes to a system badly out of date.  Sprung from the ballot-
tampering scandal of last December, the reform measure should reassure Maine voters that 
the state’s election system has been returned to health.”). 
 113. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.8a (West 2010). 
 114. MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.561 (West 2003). 
 115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.15 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 117. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005) (providing that “[a]ny justice of 
the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, or judge of the superior court in the proper 
county” can order an election official to correct the results of an election); § 29A.68.120. 
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That is, a challenger may select the level of court in which to initiate the action—
and, as discussed below, in the 2004 gubernatorial election the parties invoked the 
jurisdiction of both the Washington Supreme Court and several superior courts.118 
The statutes allow an appeal from the superior court, and also grant the supreme 
court original jurisdiction, but curiously do not specify whether an appeal is 
allowed from the court of appeals if the challenger chooses to commence the action 
in that court.119  
Washington provides a recent example of a gubernatorial election contest statute 
in practice.120 The 2004 gubernatorial election between Democrat Christine 
Gregoire and Republican Dino Rossi was razor-thin, with Gregoire enjoying a 129-
vote margin of victory after recounts.121 After preliminary litigation regarding 
which ballots to include in a recount and the secretary of state’s certification of 
Gregoire as the winner, seven electors, including some on behalf of the Republican 
Party and Rossi campaign, filed an election contest in the Chelan County Superior 
Court.122 The contesting parties chose Chelan County rather than King County, 
where most of the alleged improprieties took place, likely because they believed 
Chelan County would be a more favorable forum given that it had voted 
overwhelmingly for Rossi.123 The Democratic Central Committee intervened to 
defend the election result.124 After conducting a two-week trial, the court issued an 
oral decision in favor of Gregoire’s election, dismissing the contest.125 Rossi and 
his supporters chose not to appeal this ruling to the supreme court.126 However, 
several months later, four Rossi voters initiated an election contest in the 
Washington Supreme Court, alleging various improprieties with respect to the 
recount.127 The court ultimately dismissed three of the allegations for failure to 
                                                                                                             
Washington’s Constitution actually confers upon the legislature the power to decide election 
contests for governor.  WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“Contested elections for such officers 
shall be decided by the legislature in such manner as shall be determined by law.”).  
Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court, in 2004, asserted authority to decide an 
election contest for that state’s gubernatorial election, stating, 
We have assumed, without deciding, that chapter 29A.68 RCW confers 
jurisdiction on this court to decide the present election contests. We reserve the 
right to consider the question of whether the constitution gives the legislature 
exclusive jurisdiction over governor’s election contests if it is properly raised at 
some future time. 
In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (Wash. 2006). Thus, it is possible that the legislature would 
decide a future gubernatorial election contest, although the supreme court took it upon itself 
to perform that task in 2004. 
 118. In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 811. 
 119. §§ 29A.68.011, .120. 
 120. See, e.g., In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 809. 
 121. Ralph Thomas, Rossi Urges Revote to Fix “Mess”, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, 
at A1. 
 122. Borders v. King Cnty., No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan Cnty. Super. Ct. June 24, 2005) 
available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/content/printVersion/165891/; see In re Coday, 
130 P.3d at 811. 
 123. See David Postman, Susan Gilmore & Keith Ervin, GOP Suit Doesn’t Ask to 
Prevent Swearing-in, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A1. 
 124. In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 811. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 812. 
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state a legally cognizable claim and the fourth based on the res judicata effect of the 
Chelan County Superior Court’s decision.128 The court took “judicial notice” in 
ruling that the earlier decision had res judicata effect on the original action in the 
supreme court.129 That is, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the subsequent 
original action before it, based on the prior lower court’s resolution of the first 
election contest.130 Washington’s strange statute, which allows a contest in 
whichever forum the challengers select, resulted in the Washington Supreme Court 
never reaching the ultimate substantive merits of the dispute, even though it would 
have had original jurisdiction had the Chelan County plaintiffs filed there, and it 
also would have heard the case if the first plaintiffs had appealed. 
4. Other Tribunal Decides 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina initially ask the Board of 
Elections or a similar nonjudicial body to hear an election contest.131 South 
Carolina allows a direct appeal of the State Board of Canvasser’s decision to the 
supreme court.132 By contrast, there is no statutory right of appeal of the Rhode 
Island Board of Elections’ decision, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court will only 
grant discretionary review under a writ of certiorari based on “substantial issues of 
law.”133 
 In New Hampshire, losing parties may appeal a recount to the five-member 
Ballot Law Commission.134 The Commission is comprised of two members the 
house of representatives selects (each major party chooses a member), two 
members the senate selects (again, one from each party), and one member the 
governor appoints.135 No member of the Commission may be an elected official.136 
The supreme court may review the Ballot Law Commission’s decision, but the 
Commission’s findings of fact are “final if supported by the requisite evidence.”137 
                                                                                                             
 
 128. Id. at 815–16. 
 129. Id. at 816 n.3, 817. 
 130. But see id. at 817–19 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prior election contest 
did not bar the Supreme Court’s consideration of this case and that a contrary ruling “strikes 
at the heart of the fundamental right of every person to access the courts”). 
 131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:5 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(11) (2003); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 7-17-250 (1977). As noted earlier, Indiana also seems to direct its State 
Recount Commission to hear election contests for governor, but this provision conflicts with 
Indiana’s Constitution, which leaves gubernatorial election contests to the legislature.  See 
supra note 72. 
 132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-270. 
 133. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a); Van Daam v. DiPrete, 560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1989) 
(“There is no statutory appeal provided from a decision of the Board of Elections. The 
review by this court is discretionary and may be granted only after a showing of substantial 
issues of law.”). 
 134. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:1(I), :5(I)(b). 
 135. § 665:1(I). 
 136. Id. 
 137. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008). 
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* * * 
In sum, states use varying procedures for resolving contested elections for the 
state’s highest office. Although infrequently invoked, virtually all states have 
contemplated how to resolve a disputed gubernatorial election so that there are at 
least procedures in place ahead of time. Many states delegate the authority to hear 
the contest to the judiciary, with different rules and structures. Other states give the 
legislature the power to decide the case. The table below summarizes the wide 
variety of approaches states use to deal with this issue. 
 
 
Type of Procedure for Election 
Contests for Governor or Lieutenant 
Governor 
Number of States that Use This 
Procedure138 
Trial court has initial jurisdiction 
(including via quo warranto); appeal 
allowed  
21 
Legislature decides (either joint 
session, the House alone, or special 
committee) 
16 
Supreme court has original 
jurisdiction (including hybrid 
approaches) 
7 
Other tribunal has original 
jurisdiction 
4 
Special three-judge court with direct 
appeal to supreme court 
2 
C. Election Contests Involving Judicial Elections 
Thirty-nine states elect some or all members of their judiciaries.139 They employ 
elections for members of their general jurisdiction trial courts, appellate courts, or 
both, either through regular elections or retention elections in which voters choose 
whether to allow a judge to keep his or her position.140 Twenty-one states elect their 
highest judges, and seventeen initially appoint supreme court justices and provide 
for retention elections.141 Of course, election “contests” typically involve the 
                                                                                                             
 
 138. I placed Oregon in the “Trial Court” category, even though it is possible to read its 
constitution as conflicting with its statutes, because the legislature has delegated 
responsibility for gubernatorial election contests to its courts. See supra note 47. I placed 
Indiana in the “Other tribunal” category for the same reason. See supra note 72.  
 139. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp. The eleven states that do not have any 
elections for its judiciary are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. 
 140. Judicial Selection Methods in the States, supra note 139. 
 141. Id. The states that have elected supreme court justices are Alabama, Arkansas, 
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declared winner of an election and the second-place candidate. Thus, it is more 
likely that the states that elect their judges outright (as opposed to having retention 
elections) would explicitly provide for how to deal with election contests for those 
seats.  
Several states use their judiciaries to resolve election contests for judicial 
offices. Idaho, Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota direct their supreme courts to 
resolve an election contest for that same court.142 In Idaho, the governor “shall act 
with them” if the supreme court “shall disagree.”143 In Missouri, a nominating 
commission appoints supreme court justices for the initial term of one year, and the 
justices then must go before the voters in retention elections for a twelve-year 
term.144 Missouri’s election contest provision provides that the supreme court must 
hear and determine questions related to the retention of these judges, but circuit 
court judges hear election contests for lower courts.145 Ohio uses a single justice of 
the supreme court to decide election contests for supreme court justices: the chief 
justice must hear the case or appoint another justice to decide the dispute.146 The 
governor names a justice to hear an election contest for chief justice.147 For judicial 
contests for judges of the court of common pleas or below, however, Ohio has its 
court of appeals decide the challenge, with appeal allowed to the supreme court.148 
Finally, South Dakota grants original jurisdiction for contests involving “judicial 
officers” to its supreme court.149 
By contrast, Illinois circuit (trial) courts hear contests for supreme court and 
circuit court judges.150 Louisiana also directs election contests for supreme court 
justices and lower court judges to its trial courts, with appeal available to an en 
                                                                                                             
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. The states that provide for appointment and then retention 
elections for the state’s highest courts are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. New York does not have either outright 
elections or retention elections for its highest court judges but holds elections for its lower 
court judges. Id. 
 142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2004 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.555 (West 2003); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B) (LexisNexis 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004). In 
Idaho, a district court hears contests of retention elections for the magistrate courts. IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 34-2004. 
 143. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2004. 
 144. See Judicial Selection Methods in the States, supra note 139. 
 145. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.555, .575. 
 146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B). 
 147. Id.; see Moss v. Bush, 105 Ohio St. 3d 11, 2004-Ohio-2088, 821 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 5. 
This case involved an election contest for Ohio’s 2004 presidential electors, which the chief 
justice—who was involved in his own election contest for reelection to his seat—heard 
under section 3515.08. The chief justice refused to recuse himself based on a purported 
conflict of interest regarding the election contest for his seat given that the governor had 
appointed a different justice to hear his case. Id. at 993–94. 
 148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(C); see, e.g., Squire v. Geer, 117 Ohio St. 3d 506, 
2008-Ohio-1432, 885 N.E.2d 213 (applying “clear and convincing evidence” standard to 
election contest for judge of court of common pleas). 
 149. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7(1) (2004). 
 150. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-3 (West 2010). 
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banc session of the court of appeals.151 Oregon, too, uses trial courts, with appeal to 
the court of appeals like in a normal case.152 Pennsylvania appears to require two-
judge courts for contests involving supreme court justices and three-judge courts 
for contests for lower court judges.153 Tennessee does not specify the procedure for 
election contests for supreme court justices (who have retention elections), but 
provides that for a contested election for chancellor, the chief justice of the 
supreme court must assign a chancellor from a different division to decide the 
case.154 
Alabama and Nevada use a joint session of the legislature to resolve a disputed 
supreme court justice election, with no possibility of appeal.155 However, trial 
courts hear disputes regarding elections for lower court judges in both states.156 
Moreover, it is still possible for the state and federal judiciaries to become involved 
in an election contest for supreme court justice: In Roe v. Alabama, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Alabama 
election law regarding absentee ballots to the Alabama Supreme Court, the answer 
of which would allow the Eleventh Circuit to resolve the federal constitutional 
issues surrounding the election of Alabama’s chief justice.157 The Eleventh Circuit 
explained, “[b]ecause Alabama has barred its courts from entertaining statewide 
election contests . . . there is only one state remedy in this case: a contest in the 
legislature. The legislature, however, is not an adequate or proper forum for the 
resolution of the federal constitutional issues presented.”158 The Alabama Supreme 
Court answered the certified question by explaining that the federal court had 
incorrectly stopped the state courts from determining whether all of the properly 
cast absentee ballots had been counted and that Alabama law required the counting 
                                                                                                             
 
 151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1403, :1409(D), :1409(H) (2012). 
 152. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 258.036(1)(a), .085 (2011). Oregon statutes specify the venue for 
election contests involving judges on the supreme court, court of appeals, and tax court.  
§ 258.036(1)(a). 
 153. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3351, 3377 (West 2007); see In re Morganroth Election 
Contest, 50 Pa. D. & C. 143 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1942) (three-judge court for election contest for 
judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County). Although three 
“president” judges hear an election contest for Class III cases (judges), two president judges 
hear Class II cases (which include judges elected statewide). §§ 3291, 3351, 3377.  There are 
no reported election contests under the two-judge provision, nor does the statute provide the 
procedure in the case of a tie. 
 154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-101(a) (2003); see Taylor v. Tenn. State Democratic Exec. 
Comm., 574 S.W.2d 716, 717–18 (Tenn. 1978) (leaving open question of whether chancery 
court would have jurisdiction for a contest of an election for supreme court justice in ruling 
that it did not have jurisdiction for a nomination contest for that position). 
 155. ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.433 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
 156. In Alabama, a joint session of the legislature hears disputes for court of appeal 
judges, with no appeal allowed, but a probate court hears election contests for district and 
circuit judges, with appeal to the supreme court. ALA. CODE §§ 17-16-65, -54, -61. In 
Nevada, a trial-level court hears disputes for lower-level judges, and the court can refer the 
matter to a special master. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.413(3). The Nevada statute does not 
mention appeals. 
 157. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 158. Id. at 582 (citation omitted). 
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of all ballots.159 A challenge to the ballots based on fraud, gross negligence, or 
intentional wrongdoing, however, had to be raised in an election contest in the 
legislature.160 Having received an answer to its certified question, the Eleventh 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a trial on whether all absentee 
ballots had been counted in the same manner as they had in previous elections so as 
to avoid a federal equal protection or due process violation.161 Thus, even when 
states try to exclude any judicial involvement in state election contests, federal 
courts might enter the fray to resolve federal constitutional issues. 
West Virginia has the most unique procedure for judicial election contests of 
any of the states. Its statute provides that a special court must hear a dispute 
involving elections to the supreme court of appeals or circuit court.162 The special 
court is comprised of one person that the contestee selects, a second person that the 
contestant chooses, and a third person that the governor appoints.163 Appeal lies 
with the supreme court.164 There is apparently no prohibition on whom each party 
may select. In McWhorter v. Dorr, McWhorter objected to his opponent Morrison 
naming Dorr on the special court given that Dorr served as Morrison’s attorney in 
preparing the notice of contest and was a Morrison partisan.165 The West Virginia 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the special three-judge court is a subordinate 
legislative tribunal and not part of the judiciary, so a writ of prohibition could not 
reach it.166 Accordingly, there was nothing to stop Morrison from naming his own 
lawyer to the special court.167 
In 1968, West Virginia again used its procedures to resolve a disputed judicial 
election. Luke Terry contested the certification of Vance Sencindiver as the 
properly elected judge of the thirty-first judicial circuit.168 Each side named a 
member of the special court, and the governor chose the third member.169 The 
special court divided two-to-one in favor of Sencindiver, with Terry’s appointee 
dissenting.170 Terry appealed, and the supreme court affirmed the special court’s 
decision.171 Although the court did not specify a standard of review, its analysis 
reads as if it considered the election contest de novo, especially given that it was 
construing the legal question of whether a state law that required the polls to close 
at 7:30 PM was mandatory.172 Thus, it is unclear what role the special court 
                                                                                                             
 
 159. Roe v. Mobile Cnty. Appointment Bd., 676 So. 2d 1206, 1226 (Ala. 1995). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Roe v. Alabama, 52 F.3d 300 (11th Cir. 1995); see Roe v. Mobile Cnty. Appointing 
Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th 
Cir. 1995). 
 162. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 50 S.E. 838, 838 (W. Va. 1905). 
 166. Id. at 840. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Terry v. Sencindiver, 171 S.E.2d 480, 481 (W. Va. 1969). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 481–82. 
 171. Id. at 485. 
 172. Id. at 483–84. 
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actually played in this decision beyond contributing its initial view of the proper 
outcome. 
In the remainder of states that hold judicial elections, the statutes do not provide 
specific rules for election contests for judicial offices. Thus, presumably the general 
provisions for election contests would apply. 
In sum, only twelve of the thirty-nine states that elect their judges specify 
procedures for tribunals to use to resolve election contests for judicial positions.173 
There is little uniformity among the states that have enacted a procedure. A few 
states use the judiciary or a modified form of a judicial body to resolve the case, but 
two leave it up to the legislature. Moreover, the statutes frequently fail to provide 
any guidance as to why the state chose a particular procedure or the goals behind 
the processes enacted. Instead, judicial election contest procedures represent a 
patchwork of schemes under which states must try to operate a fair and open 
process. 
D. Election Contests Involving Congressional Elections 
Like most state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]ach House 
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members 
. . . .”174 Thus, the Constitution expressly delegates the authority to decide election 
contests for congressional seats to Congress. This is a lasting legacy of our 
Founding Fathers175 and a function of the separation of powers: as James Madison 
explained in the Federalist Papers, “it is evident that each department should have a 
will of its own, and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each 
should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the 
others.”176 
However, state tribunals still have some authority in this area, both as a matter 
of constitutional text and general practice. The Constitution delegates to the states 
the authority to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”177 
                                                                                                             
 
 173. In addition, Mississippi provides for contests for their primary, but not general, 
judicial elections. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-923 (West 2003). 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 175. Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[i]n 
the formative years of the American republic, it was the uniform practice of England and 
America for legislatures to be the final judges of the elections and qualifications of their 
members”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  As Justice Story explained, 
If [the power to judge elections is] lodged in any other than the legislative body 
itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be 
destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but itself can have the 
same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be 
so perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from 
infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the 
rights and sustain the free choice of its constituents. 
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at 
604–05 (5th ed. 1891), quoted in Morgan, 801 F.2d at 450 (alteration in original); see also 
Salamanca & Keller, supra note 28, at 255. 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
2013] PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS 25 
 
Various states have construed this language as giving them a role in deciding 
election disputes, even if the respective house might have the final say in the 
matter.178 
In Roudebush v. Hartke, the Supreme Court declared that state courts have the 
authority to order a recount in a congressional election because this was merely an 
administrative act that was consistent with the state’s power to regulate the “Times, 
Places and Manner” of conducting an election.179 The Court explained, 
[A] recount can be said to “usurp” the Senate’s function only if it 
frustrates the Senate’s ability to make an independent final judgment. A 
recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the 
election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to 
accept or reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, 
to conduct its own recount.180  
Based on this language, some state courts have concluded that they may order 
only recounts in congressional elections, while others have determined that they 
can decide election contests so long as the respective house has the ability to make 
an independent final judgment.181 Sheehan v. Franken, the judicial contest of 
Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate election between Norm Coleman and Al Franken 
that ended after the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the case in favor of 
Franken, is a recent example of a state judicial proceeding that would not have 
precluded ultimate resolution of the election in Congress.182 Under Minnesota law, 
Minnesota’s chief justice appointed a three-judge panel to hear the contest, which 
ruled in favor of Franken.183 Coleman then appealed directly to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, which also upheld the election result.184 At that point Coleman 
conceded the race.185 But if he had wished to continue the fight, he could have 
petitioned the U.S. Senate to determine if he was the proper winner. 
Congress exercises its constitutional role as the “Judge of the Elections,” at least 
for House seats, through the Federal Contested Elections Act.186 Under this Act, a 
                                                                                                             
 
 178. See Kristen R. Lisk, Note, The Resolution of Contested Elections in the U.S. House 
of Representatives: Why State Courts Should Not Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1213, 1225 n.64 (2008). 
 179. 405 U.S. 15, 21 (1972). 
 180. Id. at 25–26. 
 181. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1225–28. 
 182. Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam). 
 183. See Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934 (Minn. Dist. Apr. 13, 
2009). 
 184. Sheehan, 767 N.W.2d at 456. The relevant Minnesota statute provides that the “only 
question to be decided by the court is which party to the contest received the highest number 
of votes legally cast at the election and is therefore entitled to receive the certificate of 
election.” MINN. STAT. § 209.12 (West 2009). The court must “certify and forward the files 
and records of the proceedings, with all the evidence taken, to the presiding officer of the 
Senate or the House of Representatives of the United States.” Id. 
 185. See P.J. Huffstutter & James Oliphant, Franken Win Alters Power Equation; He’ll 
Give Democrats a 60-Vote Supermajority, But Senate Vagaries Can Override Numbers, L.A. 
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1. 
 186. 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96 (2006). Congress has not enacted similar rules for contested 
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losing candidate who wishes to contest the election of a member of the U.S. House 
of Representatives must file a notice of election contest with the clerk within thirty 
days of the state election official’s certification of the election result.187 The statute 
provides judicial-type rules for gathering evidence and conducting depositions.188 
The matter then proceeds before the Committee on House Oversight of the House 
of Representatives.189 That Committee appoints a task force with representatives 
from both parties to conduct a full investigation and submit its findings to the 
Committee, which then votes on the matter and issues a report for the full House’s 
consideration.190 The House has decided several hundred election contests 
throughout history.191 
Aside from this federal statutory mechanism, several states have adopted 
specific procedures for handling election contests for congressional seats. The types 
of processes states have enacted for resolving contested congressional elections run 
the gamut. On one end of the spectrum are states that have promulgated highly 
specialized procedures for handling congressional election contests. Connecticut, 
Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina all exemplify this approach. In 
Connecticut, the losing candidate can present an election contest to any justice of 
the supreme court, who, along with two other justices of the supreme court that the 
chief court administrator selects, decides the case.192 The statute has explicit timing 
requirements: a losing candidate must file a complaint within fourteen days after 
the election (or seven days after a manual tabulation of paper ballots), and the court 
must hear the case within three to five days.193 The court also must act quickly, 
rendering a decision “before the first Monday after the second Wednesday in 
December.”194 
In Iowa, the special court to hear congressional election contests consists of the 
chief justice of the supreme court and four judges of the district court that the full 
supreme court selects.195 Two of the selected district court judges, along with the 
chief justice, constitute a quorum, and the next most senior member of the supreme 
court shall preside if the chief justice is unavailable.196 The members of the special 
court must take an additional specific oath before hearing the case to uphold the 
U.S. and Iowa Constitutions.197 The court must render its decision “at least six days 
before the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next 
following.”198 No appeal is allowed.199 
                                                                                                             
Senate races. 
 187. 2 U.S.C. § 382. 
 188. 2 U.S.C. §§ 386–91. 
 189. 2 U.S.C. § 392. 
 190. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1233–34. 
 191. See id. at 1235. 
 192. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.1 (West 2012). 
 196. Id. 
 197. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.3 (West 2012). 
 198. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.5 (West 2012). 
 199. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.6 (West 2012). 
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Congressional election contests in New Hampshire go before a five-member 
Ballot Law Commission.200 The New Hampshire Speaker of the House and 
President of the Senate each select two of the members, one from each major 
political party.201 The governor picks the last person, with the advice and consent of 
the Executive Council (a separate elected body that is part of the executive 
branch),202 and this person must be “a person particularly qualified by experience in 
election procedure.”203 There are also five alternate members of the Ballot Law 
Commission, selected in the same manner.204 Any general election candidate—
including congressional candidates—may seek an appeal of a recount decision 
before the Ballot Law Commission.205 The statutes forbid any appeal of the Ballot 
Law Commission’s decision on a congressional race:  
No appeal may be made under this section in the cases of contested 
elections for the offices of United States senator [or] representative in 
congress . . . in view of the constitutional provisions vesting in both 
houses of congress . . . exclusive jurisdiction over the elections and 
qualifications of their respective members.206  
Thus, New Hampshire gives its electoral administrative body oversight, in a 
quasi-judicial manner, of congressional election contests but adheres to the 
constitutional grant of final decision-making authority to each house of Congress to 
determine the election of its own members.  
South Carolina also delegates to its Board of Canvassers the authority to resolve 
election contests for federal offices but allows an appeal to the state supreme 
court.207 Indiana, too, provides for election contests for legislative seats before its 
state recount commission, although its statutes focus more on recounts than on 
contests.208 
On the other end of the spectrum are states that expressly prohibit contests for 
U.S. House and Senate elections. Kansas,209 Nevada,210 Ohio,211 and Texas212 all 
explicitly exclude congressional election contests from their election contest 
provisions. Ohio is perhaps most direct:  
                                                                                                             
 
 200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I) (2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 201. Id. 
 202.  N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 60 (“There shall be biennially elected, by ballot, five 
councilors, for advising the governor in the executive part of government.”) 
 203. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I). 
 204. § 665:1(II). 
 205. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 660:1 (providing for recounts in “any” election), 660:2 
(mentioning congressional elections in the schedule of fees required for recounts), 665:8 
(discussing appeals of a recount decision) (2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 206. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 207. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-17-260 (providing for the board to decide election contests for 
“federal officers”), -270 (1977 & Supp. 2011) (discussing appeals). 
 208. IND. CODE § 3-12-11-21 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1435 (2000). 
 210. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.407 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 211. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 212. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 2010). 
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The nomination or election of any person to any federal office, 
including . . . the office of member of congress, shall not be subject to a 
contest of election conducted under this chapter. Contests of the 
nomination or election of any person to any federal office shall be 
conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of federal 
law.213  
Thus, candidates seeking to contest a congressional election in these states may 
bring the challenge only in federal court or the respective house. However, state 
courts still sometimes manage to enter the fray. For example, in 2008, the election 
for Ohio’s Fifteenth Congressional District was subject to intense litigation in both 
state and federal court over disputes about the eligibility of particular provisional 
ballots.214 This suggests that the Ohio courts found a meaningful distinction 
between ballot eligibility issues and a formal election contest. Similarly, courts in 
Texas still can hear election contests involving primaries for federal legislative 
seats. Although the Texas election contest provision is inapplicable to “a general or 
special election for the office of United States senator or United States 
representative,”215 the Texas Court of Appeals considered an election contest 
stemming from a 2004 Democratic primary for the U.S. House.216  
In the middle are states that either refer to congressional election contests 
obliquely or provide election contest provisions for any election without specifying 
explicitly whether elections to Congress fall within the statute’s scope. For 
example, in Georgia an aggrieved voter or candidate may contest “[t]he nomination 
of any person who is declared nominated at a primary as a candidate for any 
federal, state, county, or municipal office” and “the election of any person who is 
declared elected to any such office.”217 The contester must bring the case to a 
superior court and can appeal to the supreme court as in a normal case.218 Oregon219 
and Vermont220 specify the venue for a congressional election contest but otherwise 
do not provide any unique procedures. Pennsylvania separates election contests for 
U.S. Senate and House: Senate disputes go before a two-judge court of “president 
judges” of the court of common pleas; House election challenges are tried and 
determined by the court of common pleas of the county in which the winner 
resides.221 Arkansas law provides a process for contesting U.S. Senate elections—
                                                                                                             
 
 213. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A). 
 214. Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(remanding case back to the Ohio Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction over the original 
mandamus action).  
 215. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001(1). 
 216. Rodriguez v. Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 217. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-521 (2008). 
 218. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-523, -528 (2008). 
 219. OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1)(a) (2011) (providing that the Circuit Court for Marion 
County is the proper venue).  A party can appeal the court’s decision to the court of appeals 
as in a normal case. § 258.085. 
 220. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c) (2002 & Supp. 2011) (providing that parties 
wishing to contest an election for a congressional seat must file in the Superior Court for 
Washington County). 
 221. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3291, 3351, 3401 (West 2007).  Senate election 
disputes are considered “Class II” contests, and House election contests are “Class IV” 
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by filing in the Pulaski County Circuit Court with an appeal allowed only within 
seven days of the court’s determination of the election result—but does not 
mention any similar processes for elections to the U.S. House of Representatives.222  
Michigan has not enacted any procedures for deciding congressional election 
contests, but it has promulgated detailed provisions for protecting the ballots during 
the pendency of a contest occurring in the respective house.223 The supreme court 
(for Senate races) or a circuit court (for House races) can issue a restraining order 
to preserve the ballot boxes.224 The supreme court has further powers for Senate 
contests: it can require delivery of the ballot boxes to the county clerk and appoint 
three commissioners to open the ballot boxes and “place them in packages securely 
wrapped and sealed and so marked as to show in what voting districts such ballots 
were cast.”225 
The remainder of states do not mention congressional elections at all in their 
election contest statutes. Presumably, then, either election contests for these seats 
are forbidden (meaning that a challenger must go to federal court or directly to the 
respective house), or election contests fall within the general election contest 
provision that applies to “any” election in the state.226 
The analysis of the various mechanisms states use to handle congressional 
election contests demonstrates the lack of consistency among the states. Most states 
that mention congressional election contests channel these disputes to the state’s 
courts, but alternatives also exist. Ultimately, Congress has the final say in any 
dispute involving one of its own seats, making any “conclusive” determination 
from a state entity actually advisory. State tribunals can nonetheless have a 
significant influence in giving an appearance of finality, thereby convincing the 
losing candidate to concede before a contest ever reaches Congress.  
E. Election Contests Involving Presidential Electors 
As is well known, U.S. citizens do not vote for President or Vice President 
directly but instead vote for “electors” as part of the Electoral College.227 Each state 
                                                                                                             
contests. § 3291. 
 222. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-801(b), -810 (2011). 
 223. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.109–.120 (West 2008) (providing special 
provisions for preserving evidence in contested U.S. Senate elections); §§ 168.150–.155  
(providing similar procedures for contested U.S. House elections). 
 224. §§ 160.109, 168.112–.113, 168.150–.151. 
 225. §§ 168.109, .112–.113. 
 226. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-402(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (“The election or 
nomination of any person to any public office, and the declared result of the vote on any 
ballot proposition or bond proposition submitted to a vote of the people may be contested 
according to the procedures established in this part . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 
Bickerstaff, supra note 17, at 433 (“State recounts and possibly even state judicial election 
contests can proceed as a means of policing state election laws, so long as they do not 
interfere with the exclusive power of the respective houses of Congress to ultimately 
determine the election dispute.”). 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 3; see also Att’y Gen. of the Territory of Guam v. 
United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Thus, citizens do not vote for the 
President. Electors, appointed by ‘each State,’ vote for the President. . . . The right to vote in 
presidential elections under Article II inheres not in citizens but in states: citizens vote 
indirectly for the President by voting for state electors.”). 
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appoints the electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”228 
Every state except Maine and Nebraska appoints its presidential electors based on 
the statewide popular vote, while Maine and Nebraska appoint their presidential 
electors proportionally based on the vote in each congressional district.229 Voting 
for presidential electors in most states thus resembles gubernatorial and other 
statewide elections. Consequently, challenges to the counting of ballots for 
presidential electors resemble challenges to the counting of ballots for other 
statewide elections and are presumptively subject to the state’s election contest 
provisions. 
It may seem odd that there is no federal constitutional mechanism for resolving 
presidential election disputes. The President is a nationwide, federal position, even 
if each state appoints the presidential electors who ultimately vote for President. 
The Constitution does provide that the House of Representatives, voting through 
state delegations, will decide a presidential election in the case of a tie in the 
Electoral College or if a candidate does not receive a majority of electoral votes.230 
But there is no constitutional mechanism for disputing the outcome of an election 
or the awarding of presidential electors to one candidate or another. 
Perhaps this is not so surprising. The Founding Fathers were unfamiliar with 
election contests for executive offices.231 Moreover, “[t]he Electoral College in 
each state is an institution of state government, and it is understandable if the 
Framers (to the extent they thought about it at all) assumed that any disputes over 
ballots cast for a state’s presidential electors would be handled within the state’s 
own governmental apparatus.”232  
The most famous disputed presidential election before Bush v. Gore was the 
Hayes-Tilden controversy of 1886, during which Congress created a special 
Electoral Commission of five senators, five representatives, and five Supreme 
Court Justices to determine whether Rutherford B. Hayes or Samuel Tilden was the 
proper winner.233 The Election Commission ruled eight to seven in favor of Hayes, 
with Justice Joseph Bradley providing the tiebreaking vote for Hayes.234 
In the wake of this dispute, Congress attempted to place some parameters 
around a state’s independent resolution of presidential election controversies. 
Under the Electoral Count Act of 1887, a state can guarantee that its electoral votes 
will count if it creates, before Election Day, a scheme to resolve contests that will 
ensure the resolution of all disputes at least six days prior to the meeting of 
electors.235 This “safe harbor” provision was the focus of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 229. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-714 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
 230. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 231. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 26 (explaining that “[t]he 
Founders could not look to their colonial history for experience on how to handle a dispute 
over any kind of election for a chief executive”). 
 232. Id. at 25–26. 
 233. See John Copeland Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1732, 
1743–45 (2004). 
 234. Id. at 1747. 
 235. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) (“If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the 
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy 
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decision in Bush v. Gore, in which the majority concluded that Florida would not 
be able to complete an additional recount before the December 12 deadline and 
therefore could not guarantee by law that the Electoral College would include its 
electoral votes.236 A state that wishes to make certain that its electoral votes will 
count under the “safe harbor” provision must promulgate a procedure ahead of time 
that mandates a final resolution of the dispute before the federal statutory 
deadline.237 
Surprisingly, not every state spells out how to decide election contests for 
presidential electors. Only twenty of the fifty states and the District of Columbia 
provide specific guidance for these types of disputes.238 In the states that do 
explicitly include electors in their election contest statutes, much as before, the 
procedures lack consistency. Most processes involve the state’s judiciary: twelve 
states channel the dispute to the judicial process.239 But the procedures for who 
hears the case also vary among the states. 
Five states provide for a trial court initially to consider the challenge, typically 
with regular appeal to the court of appeals.240 By contrast, five states form a special 
court to decide the dispute. Pennsylvania grants jurisdiction to resolve presidential 
elector contests to the court with the “two nearest president judges.”241 Iowa and 
Minnesota use the same process for presidential elector contests as they do for 
contests to congressional seats, in which the state designates a special multi-
                                                                                                             
or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial 
or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six 
days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant 
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1435, -1437 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.01 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 128.100 
(West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A) 
(LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1)(a) (2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3291 
(West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (1977 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-
22-4, -5, -6, -13 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-103 (2003); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. 
§ 221.002 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c)(2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 
(2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-114 (2011). 
 239. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra notes 
240–48 and accompanying text. 
 240. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16400, 16900 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5927 
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 258.036, .085 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-22-7, -25 
(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2010).  South Dakota law provides that appeal lies 
directly to the supreme court as in a normal civil proceeding.  See § 12-22-25. 
 241. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3291, 3351. 
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member court to hear the case.242 Kansas uses the same election contest procedure 
for presidential electors as it does for statewide offices: the supreme court assigns 
three district judges to hear the dispute in the District Court of Shawnee County, 
with direct appeal allowed to the state supreme court.243 Similarly, Virginia’s 
statute covering primaries for U.S. Senate or any other statewide office also applies 
to presidential electors.244 The contest is heard in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond before a special court composed of the chief judge of the circuit court 
and two circuit judges from different circuits “not contiguous to the City of 
Richmond” whom the chief justice of the supreme court appoints.245 The statute 
also includes contingencies if the chief judge or the chief justice is unavailable, as 
well as strict timing requirements.246 The provisions do not specify whether an 
appeal is allowed. 
Two states—Colorado and Connecticut—give their supreme courts original 
jurisdiction over election contests for presidential electors. In Colorado, the full 
supreme court decides the dispute.247 Connecticut uses the same procedure for 
presidential elector contests as it does for congressional races: the losing party can 
present the contest to any judge of the supreme court, and that judge, with two 
other supreme court judges that the chief court administrator selects, decides the 
case.248 
By contrast, seven states employ a nonjudicial decision maker to resolve 
election contests for presidential electors.249 Indiana,250 New Hampshire,251 and 
South Carolina252 use the same board for presidential elector contests as they do for 
congressional seats; New Hampshire and South Carolina allow appeal to the 
supreme court, while Indiana’s law does not specify whether the losing party may 
appeal.253 
Tennessee and Wyoming do not use the judiciary at all in the process. In 
Tennessee, an election contest goes before a Presidential Electors Tribunal 
composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general (who 
serves as the reporter).254 In Wyoming, the legislature has the task of deciding 
                                                                                                             
 
 242. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.1; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.01(2) (defining a “statewide 
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presidential elector contests.255 Missouri also leaves an election contest for 
presidential electors up to its legislature, but its statute includes detailed rules for 
the evidence gathering process, allowing a judge to take and certify testimony in a 
deposition.256 No appeal is allowed in any of these states.257 
Texas avoids any formal adjudicatory method altogether and instead grants the 
governor exclusive jurisdiction to resolve contests involving presidential 
electors.258 Of course, giving the governor unfettered discretion could invite a 
conflict of interest because the governor could tip the election to a political ally. 
Finally, one state—Ohio—explicitly excludes presidential elections from its 
election contest statutes, much like it does for other federal offices, instead 
directing any resolution of presidential elector contests to “applicable provisions of 
federal law.”259 
As noted above, thirty states do not provide specific guidance on how to resolve 
election contests for presidential electors.260 Thus, parties will invoke the particular 
state’s regular election contest provisions, many of which apply to “any” election in 
the state.261 Virtually all of these states involve the judiciary and ask a trial-level 
court to make an initial assessment of the case. Ultimately, however, the lack of 
explicit guidance on the proper procedures can prove problematic at a time when 
political passions are high, as the Florida 2000 election experience demonstrated. 
Additionally, the tight deadline under which states must certify who won their 
presidential electors to qualify under the federal “safe harbor” provision makes this 
lack of guidance for post-election disputes even more disconcerting. 
* * * 
If the foregoing discussion demonstrates anything, it is that election contest 
provisions are all over the map—both literally and figuratively. There is little 
consistency both with respect to the type of office under contention and among the 
states generally. Some states use their judiciary quite liberally to resolve all sorts of 
election contests. Other states leave it up to their legislature, create a special 
tribunal, or give an administrative body such as the board of elections the authority 
to resolve disputes.  
A major omission from the multitude of mechanisms for resolving election 
contests is the impetus behind their creation. Why have state legislatures enacted 
                                                                                                             
 
 255. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-114 (2011). 
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special procedures for election contests? Obviously there is something unique 
regarding the manner of deciding the proper winner of an election. The next Part 
identifies trends among the different types of procedures, uncovering several goals 
legislatures implicitly consider in determining who should decide election contests 
and delineating the way the cases must proceed. This analysis will help to start the 
discussion of “best practices” for election contest provisions moving forward. 
II. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTION CONTEST PROCEDURES 
As the description of the various modes of election contest procedures in the 
previous Part demonstrates, in many ways state election contest processes are all 
over the map. States differ widely in the types of procedures available to contest 
elections to various offices. But that does not mean that there are no unifying 
trends. This Part takes a closer look at three common features of election contest 
provisions: statutory deadlines, specific procedural details, and appeals. 
A. Statutory Deadlines 
State election contest codes promote timeliness in resolving the dispute in two 
ways. First, most states have strict provisions for when a complaining party must 
file an election contest.262 Second, many state statutes provide either mandatory or 
aspirational goals for when the court or other tribunal must resolve the case.263 
Deadlines to file election contests are mandatory and strict. The Illinois 
Supreme Court explained that “[c]ourts have no inherent power to hear election 
contests, but may do so only when authorized by statute and in the manner dictated 
by statute,” and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute 
unless the plaintiff had timely filed the election contest.264 The court then went 
through a painstaking discussion of determining the triggering event for the running 
of Illinois’s ten-day time limit for filing the action, ultimately concluding that a 
plaintiff must file the case within ten days after the state board of elections (as 
opposed to the county board) completes its final canvass of returns.265 
Of the fifty states, all but four include specific deadlines for when a challenger 
can bring an election contest.266 The deadlines generally range from as few as three 
days after the election results are certified (primary elections for governor in 
Maryland)267 to as long as forty days (all elections in Oregon).268 Montana and 
                                                                                                             
 
 262. E.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-49 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(2) 
(West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1439 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.021(1) (West 
2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.09 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 
§ 2603(c) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005). 
 263. See infra notes 267–280 and accompanying text. 
 264. Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ill. 1990). 
 265. Id. at 589–95. 
 266. The four states that do not list deadlines in their statutes are Maine, Massachusetts, 
New York, and Rhode Island. As discussed above, New York uses quo warranto, not a 
statutory election contest procedure. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. 
 267. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 268. OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036 (2011). In a presidential election, Oregon’s statutory 
deadline would authorize a contest action even after the federal safe harbor provision has 
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North Dakota appear to be the outliers. Montana allows an action to “contest the 
right of a candidate to be declared elected to an office or to annul and set aside the 
election or to remove from or deprive any person of an office” for up to one year 
after the election.269 In North Dakota, there is no time limitation for an allegation of 
bribery or if the person elected cannot meet the qualifications to hold the office.270 
Generally, however, a common timing requirement for filing an election contest is 
between five and fourteen days after the completion of the canvass or certification 
of the result.271 Most states include these strict deadlines to ensure that the election 
does not drag on indefinitely.272  
Many states also include specific timeliness requirements or goals directed to 
the decision maker in their election contest provisions. For example, Arkansas law 
provides, 
If the case comes in regular term, it shall be given precedence and be 
speedily determined. The judge may adjourn other courts in order to 
hear these cases and may call another judge in exchange to sit in other 
courts or vacate the bench in other courts and cause a special judge to 
be elected to hold the court.273  
Virginia directs its judges to decide election contests “as soon as possible.”274 
South Dakota assists its judges in deciding cases quickly by authorizing the chief 
justice of the supreme court to relieve a lower court judge of his or her official 
duties so the judge can focus on the election contest.275  
Some states set specific deadlines on when the court must hear or decide the 
case, although the statutes do not provide any specific remedy for a failure to 
comply. In New Jersey, a person seeking to challenge an election must file a 
petition within thirty days after the election, and the judge must hear the complaint 
within fifteen to thirty days after filing.276 States also may require a judge to rule 
within a certain time period. For instance, in Arizona, the court must render its 
decision within five days after the hearing.277 For Connecticut election contests to 
federal office, the court must decide the case “before the first Monday after the 
second Wednesday in December.”278 Similarly, some states limit the ability of 
judges to adjourn the proceedings: Ohio law stipulates that the court cannot allow 
adjournments for more than thirty days,279 while a Texas judge can continue a 
                                                                                                             
passed and just before the meeting of electors. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). 
 269. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-102(2) (2011). Moreover, “[t]he court is always 
considered to be in session for the trial of contest cases.” § 13-36-206. 
 270. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-04 (2009). 
 271. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-12-8-5 (2005) (fourteen days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 
(1977) (five days). 
 272. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1222 (“The value of finality represents the need to have 
election contests resolved promptly so that elected officials may rightfully take office, 
ideally when their terms begin.”) (emphasis in original). 
 273. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-802(b) (2011). 
 274. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-810 (2011). 
 275. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-18 (2004). 
 276. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-3, -4 (West 1999). 
 277. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-676(B) (2006). 
 278. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009). 
 279. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.11 (LexisNexis 2012). 
36 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1 
 
contest involving a primary or a runoff election for only ten days, unless both 
parties consent otherwise.280 
The reasons for these deadlines are obvious: there is an inherent value in 
deciding an election law case quickly.281 Protracted litigation draws out the 
election, and continued uncertainty as to the winner might entrench litigants in their 
positions and contribute to negative public discourse.282 It also can impede public 
confidence in the election and even in the legitimacy of the ultimate winner.283 Of 
course, strict deadlines also might have a downside: they may force a court to 
render a decision before it is ready, eliminating a judge’s ability to proceed 
deliberately in deciding a difficult question. 
Prompt resolution of elections is good for our democracy.284 A state’s process 
has resulted in a “failed election” when its contest provisions still do not allow the 
state to identify a winner by the date on which the winner is to take office.285 
Whether states choose to set specific deadlines or instead include merely 
aspirational timeliness language in their codes is a policy choice up to state 
legislatures, and it is one that states should actively consider. 
In sum, timeliness is essentially a universal attribute of states’ election contest 
provisions, employed for both primary and general elections and cutting across 
types of elections. States place a high value on adjudicating disputed elections 
quickly. Losing candidates must decide shortly after certification of the results 
whether to continue the fight, and courts are admonished to decide cases quickly, 
sometimes even under strict guidelines.  
B. Specific Procedural Details Regarding the Judicial Process 
As the analysis in Part I demonstrates, there are various structures states employ 
to decide election contests, including giving the case to the legislature, the state 
supreme court, a special nonjudicial tribunal, or the state’s regular court system.286 
Using the judiciary is the most common mechanism. Therefore, it is important to 
understand in greater detail the nuances of how states invoke the judicial process. 
Typically, states that involve the judiciary in an election contest send the case to 
the trial court of general jurisdiction. A common trait is to treat an election contest 
like any other case, with the possible exception of including more stringent timing 
                                                                                                             
 
 280. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.012(e) (West 2010). 
 281. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1222. 
 282. See Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 299, 302 (2012). 
 283. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 293 (“[I]t is important that representatives serve with 
full authority and respect, rather than with unresolved questions about their legitimacy.”). 
 284. Id. at 292–93. 
 285. Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 361 (2007) [hereinafter Foley, Analysis & 
Mitigation]. But see Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of 
Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L REV. 83, 143–44 n. 196 (2012) (arguing that a failed election 
is one that declares the wrong person the winner and that leaving a seat vacant even after the 
person is supposed to take office is less concerning for a multimember body that can still 
function while the election contest is resolved). 
 286. See supra Part I. 
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requirements such as a deadline by which a party must initiate the contest.287 For 
example, Idaho directs that election contests “shall be held according to the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure so far as practicable.”288 Accordingly, even though the 
election contest provisions usually appear in a separate part of a state’s code, Idaho 
exemplifies the approach of asking the judiciary to act as it normally does in 
resolving a dispute. 
Although a few states use a three-judge panel of trial judges,289 in most of the 
states a single judge initially hears the challenge. Moreover, there are not many 
guidelines for selecting the judge that considers the case. Instead, the judiciary uses 
its regular method for assigning judges. For example, in Alaska a person wishing to 
challenge an election simply must file in the superior court, and the statute does not 
specify any particular rule for how the judge is assigned.290  
Of the states that send the case to a trial-level court, only a handful provide 
specifics on who should select the judge hearing the dispute. In Minnesota291 and 
New Jersey,292 the chief justice of the supreme court appoints the judge or judges 
for the lower court, while in Kansas293 the entire supreme court assigns three 
district judges to hear the case. In Georgia,294 Maryland,295 and Wisconsin,296 the 
chief administrative judge for the judicial district assigns the trial court. Texas does 
not provide guidance on how to select a judge but does stipulate that a judge is 
disqualified from hearing the case if the judge’s district includes any territory 
subject to a non-statewide contested election.297 All other states that send a case to 
a trial-level court do not declare how that judge is assigned, meaning that the state 
will use its regular method.298 
A couple of states involve the parties in selecting the judges to sit on a special 
court to resolve the case. As noted above, West Virginia uses a special three-
member election court in which each side picks a judge and the governor chooses 
                                                                                                             
 
 287. See supra Part II.A. 
 288. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2013 (2008).  Idaho requires a party to initiate the election 
contest within twenty days after the votes are canvassed. § 34-2008. See also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 1999) (“The proceedings shall be similar to those in a civil action so 
far as practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the court . . . .”). 
 289. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009). 
 290. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.550 (2010). 
 291. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009). 
 292. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-2 (West 2009). 
 293. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000). 
 294. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523(c) (2008). 
 295. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 296. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(6)(b) (West 2004) (directing chief administrative judge for 
the judicial district to assign the trial judge if the election is held in more than one judicial 
circuit, and directing the chief justice of the supreme court to make the appointment if the 
election is held in more than one judicial administrative district). 
 297. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 231.004(a) (West 2010) (“The judge of a judicial district 
that includes any territory covered by a contested election that is less than statewide is 
disqualified to preside in the contest.”). 
 298. Many courts have a random-assignment method of selecting the judge for a case, 
such as through lotteries. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping For a Venue: The Need for 
More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 292 (1996); Adam M. Samaha, 
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47 (2009). 
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the third.299 For county elections in Iowa, each side names a member of the contest 
court, and those two members select a third.300 If the parties fail to select a member, 
or if the two members cannot agree on a third person, then the chief judge of the 
judicial district makes the selection.301 
Just as states generally offer little guidance for how to select the judge or judges 
hearing the case, only a few states provide rules on the specific venue most 
appropriate for an election contest. Most states simply allow venue in the judicial 
district in which the declared winner resides or where the election took place.302 A 
handful of states, however, channel election contests to a specific court, typically in 
the state capital, while often allowing venue in the county of the challenger’s 
residence as well.303 
Most states specify who may dispute an election and typically allow either the 
candidate who lost, any eligible voter, or both to initiate an election contest.304 A 
few states are slightly stricter and require a group of eligible voters to commence 
the litigation.305 Some states even allow a political party306 or the county clerk who 
conducted the election to file the case.307 
States also provide instructions to challengers regarding what arguments they 
may raise in an election contest, thereby specifying in essence a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction in a challenge to an election result. The types of challenges are 
fairly consistent across states. Typically, states allow an election contest for the 
following: (1) misconduct, fraud, bribery, or corruption; (2) ineligibility of the 
                                                                                                             
 
 299. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 300. IOWA CODE ANN. § 62.1A (West 2012). Recall that for gubernatorial elections Iowa 
uses a “contest court” of fourteen members of its legislature. See supra notes 77, 80 and 
accompanying text. 
 301. § 62.1A. 
 302. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003) (“Any action to contest an election 
shall be commenced by filing a verified complaint of contest in the district court of the 
county where either of the parties resides.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7(2) (2004) (“As 
to all other contests [not involving state offices or judicial officers of the Supreme Court], 
[original jurisdiction exists] in the circuit court of a county which includes the locality where 
the election or some part thereof was conducted.”). 
 303. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672(B) (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801(b) (2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1685 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1438(a) (2000); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1404 (2012); MINN. 
STAT. § 209.045 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102 (LexisNexis 2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-182.14 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(a) (2011); TEX. 
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.006(a) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c) (2002 & 
Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 (2011). Wisconsin does not specify a venue for the 
trial court but requires all appeals of contests for statewide offices to go to the 4th District 
Court of Appeals. WIS. STAT. § 9.01(9)(b) (West 2004). 
 304. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-521 (2008). 
 305. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.540 (2010) (allowing a candidate or ten qualified 
voters to bring an election contest); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.2a (West 2010) 
(allowing a candidate or a voter who submits a verified petition signed by at least as many 
voters as would satisfy a nominating petition to file an election contest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
19:29-2 (West 1999) (allowing a candidate or twenty-five voters to contest an election). 
 306. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-172 (West 2008) (allowing a political party directly 
interested in the election to file an election contest); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-11-1 
(LexisNexis 2011) (allowing the state chairman of the candidate’s political party to file an 
election contest if the losing candidate fails to do so within the statutory deadline). 
 307. See OR. REV. STAT. § 258.016 (allowing a voter, candidate, county clerk who 
conducted the election, or secretary of state (if the election involved a state measure, recall 
of a state officer, or candidate for whom the secretary of state is the filing officer) to contest 
the election).  
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person elected to hold the office; (3) illegal votes being counted; or (4) legal votes 
being rejected.308 Moreover, the challenged votes must actually have the potential 
to change the outcome; courts will not sustain a challenge, even if there was 
misconduct, upon a finding that the winner would be the same even with the 
misconduct occurring.309 Thus, there is no omnipresent right to an error-free 
election; a challenger must also be able to show that the errors would have actually 
changed the result or at least put the outcome in doubt.310 Stated differently, a 
challenger must show “but for” causation. 
Moving to the evidence-gathering process, a few states have addressed whether 
a court can compel voters to testify as to how they voted, with some states allowing 
this practice and others finding it an unwarranted invasion of a voter’s privacy. 
Texas exemplifies the former approach:  
A voter who cast an illegal vote may be compelled, after the illegality 
has been established to the satisfaction of the tribunal hearing the 
contest, to disclose the name of the candidate for whom the voter voted 
or how the voter voted on a measure if the issue is relevant to the 
election contest.311  
A challenger in a Texas House of Representatives contest invoked this statute in 
early 2011 to compel voters to disclose for whom they voted.312  
By contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court held that voters should not have to 
make public how they voted because the testimony might be unreliable and because 
it cuts against the goals of a secret ballot.313  
Maine takes a hybrid approach, granting every person an evidentiary privilege to 
refuse to disclose how he or she voted unless the court finds that the vote was cast 
illegally or that the court should compel the voter to testify pursuant to the state’s 
election laws.314 Washington similarly allows testimony regarding only specified 
votes:  
                                                                                                             
 
 308. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-40 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 57.1(2) 
(West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.016; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.003; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 20A-4-402(1) (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-101 (2011). 
 309. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-41; WASH. REV. CODE. § 29A.68.110 (West 2005). 
 310. Edward B. Foley, The Legitimacy of Imperfect Elections: Optimality, Not 
Perfection, Should Be the Goal of Election Administration, in MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT: 
FEDERAL ELECTION LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 97, 99, 109 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006). 
 311. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.009(a); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 62.17 (West 2012) 
(“The court may require any person called as a witness, who voted at such election, to 
answer touching the person’s qualifications as a voter, and, if the person was not a registered 
voter in the county where the person voted, then to answer for whom the person voted.”). 
 312. Tim Eaton, Votes in Disputed Election Disclosed, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN 
(Texas), Feb. 2, 2011, at B01. 
 313. Huggins v. Super. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Navajo, 788 P.2d 81, 83–84 (Ariz. 1990). 
 314. ME. R. EVID. 506; see also McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 630–
31 (Mass. 1982) (holding that a court cannot compel “good faith” voters to testify as to how 
they voted, but leaving open whether a court can compel those who intentionally voted 
fraudulently to testify). 
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No testimony may be received as to any illegal votes unless the party 
contesting the election delivers to the opposite party, at least three days 
before trial, a written list of the number of illegal votes and by whom 
given, that the contesting party intends to prove at the trial. No 
testimony may be received as to any illegal votes, except as to such as 
are specified in the list.315  
This statute does not resolve, however, whether the court can compel the illegal 
voters themselves to testify as to how they voted.  Missouri, through its 
constitution, also takes a hybrid approach, mandating the secrecy of ballots except 
for contested elections, grand jury investigations, and civil or criminal trials 
involving the violation of an election law.316 
Trial judges usually act as the primary evidence gatherer and fact finder—but 
not always. For instance, in Nebraska, an “official of the court” takes testimony, 
administers oaths, and compels the attendance of witnesses.317 Missouri has a 
similar provision, albeit not for the trial court: its supreme court has original 
jurisdiction over an election contest for a statewide office, and the court can 
appoint a commissioner to take testimony regarding specific points and facts that 
the court directs.318 Moreover, although most states explicitly dictate that the court 
must decide the case without a jury,319 Montana allows a judge to empanel a jury to 
resolve questions of fact,320 while Georgia stipulates that the judge should decide 
the case without a jury unless one of the litigants demands a jury trial and other 
laws would permit a jury for that issue.321 In that instance the judge can require the 
jury to return only a special verdict if the election was held in a single county and 
must require the jury to return a special verdict if the election took place across 
multiple counties.322 
Finally, although most states that use the judiciary attempt to treat the case like 
any other civil action, often judges are given special powers. For example, in New 
Jersey, a judge presiding over the case has the authority to order any amendments 
to the petition and to “compel the production of all ballot boxes, books, papers, 
tally lists, ballots and other documents which may be required at such hearing.”323 
Similarly, in South Dakota, the court may “make such order or orders as the court 
                                                                                                             
 
 315. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.100 (West 2005). 
 316.  MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“All election officers shall be sworn or affirmed not to 
disclose how any voter voted; provided, that in cases of contested elections, grand jury 
investigations and in the trial of all civil or criminal cases in which the violation of any law 
relating to elections, including nominating elections, is under investigation or at issue, such 
officers may be required to testify and the ballots cast may be opened, examined, counted, 
and received as evidence.”). 
 317. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1103 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 318. MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 115.555, .561 (West 2003). 
 319. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 1999). 
 320. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-207 (2011). 
 321. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-526(a) (2008). 
 322. § 21-2-526(c). It is unclear why the Georgia statute requires special verdicts for 
multiple county contests but merely permits them for single county contests. 
 323. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-5, -6; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.12 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
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deems necessary to bring about the expeditious and just determination of the 
contest,” which can include shortening the time for an answer, actively managing 
discovery, and appointing referees.324 In this manner, states attempt to give trial-
level judges great discretion over managing the case. Some jurisdictions also 
include special procedural protections in an election contest: in South Dakota and 
Texas, for example, a default judgment is expressly prohibited.325 In Washington, 
by contrast, the court can dismiss the case for want of prosecution.326 
In sum, states have varying methods for using their judiciaries to resolve 
election contests, but a few trends emerge: most often, states randomly assign a 
judge to hear an election contest, although several states at least specify the proper 
venue for a dispute. Most courts must decide the case without a jury, although in a 
few states the court can appoint an official to take testimony and gather evidence. 
Statutes usually include the substantive bases a party may allege to contest an 
election, which are generally consistent across the states. Finally, most states 
attempt to treat election contests like any other civil case, although some states give 
judges additional powers. These trends are important to keep in mind when 
formulating best practices for election contest procedures. 
C. Appellate Review 
Most state election contest statutes either provide for some form of appellate 
review or stipulate that no review is permissible. The states that prohibit appeals 
typically do so when either the legislature or the state’s supreme court decides the 
case in the first instance.327 These states send the case directly to the final decision 
maker. In the remainder of states, challengers are allowed to appeal the case up the 
judicial ladder. Of course, there are some variations: In Connecticut, for example, 
upon request from a party a superior court judge must make findings of fact and 
then certify any questions of law that the parties contest to the chief justice of the 
supreme court, who immediately calls a special session of the supreme court to 
resolve the legal issue.328 A party who then ultimately loses the contest at the 
superior court, however, can still appeal that court’s final judgment to the supreme 
court, which may promulgate rules of procedure for a “speedy and inexpensive” 
resolution of the case within fifteen days of the superior court’s final judgment.329 
                                                                                                             
 
 324. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-10 (2004). 
 325. See § 12-22-17; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.004 (West 2010). 
 326. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.050 (West 2005). 
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In Louisiana, appeals for most election contests must go to the full en banc courts 
of appeal (instead of a three-judge panel), and the losing party may seek certiorari 
review at the state supreme court.330 
Although many states simply channel appeals through their normal appellate 
process,331 other states skip the intermediate or court of appeals stage and allow a 
party to appeal a trial court’s decision directly to the state’s supreme court. This 
procedure streamlines the process and contributes to timeliness.332 For example, 
both Kansas and Minnesota have their supreme courts appoint a three-judge court 
to hear certain election contests and then allow direct appeal of the three-judge 
court’s decision to the supreme court.333 Sometimes this expedited appeal 
procedure is limited to statewide offices: in Minnesota, an appeal of an election 
contest decision for all contests besides statewide offices must go first to the court 
of appeals.334  
Another common attribute of election contest appellate provisions is the 
requirement that the appellant post a bond.335 The purpose of the bond is to ensure 
that the party appealing the lower court’s decision will be able to cover the costs of 
an appeal. It also has the corollary effect of, in theory, reducing the number of 
appeals because it provides an added hurdle for litigants who want to continue the 
fight.336 That is, the states that require appellants to post a bond are also sending a 
signal that appeals in an election contest are less favored. 
Many of the provisions related to appealing an election contest decision are 
intended to foster prompt finality. For example, Minnesota permits, and North 
Dakota requires, its appellate courts to hear election contest appeals in a summary 
fashion.337 In Utah, an appeal does not stay the district court’s execution or further 
proceedings, except for costs.338 Presumably, this both encourages finality of the 
lower court’s decision and discourages appeals in the first place, as the parties 
know that an appeal will neither prevent the lower court’s decision from going into 
effect nor stop the winner from taking office. 
Some state statutes are even ambiguous as to whether appeals are permitted. 
Wisconsin’s election contest provision states that challengers can appeal an election 
result after a recount first to a state trial court and then to the court of appeals 
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(which must be the Fourth District Court of Appeals if the election is statewide).339 
The statute then provides, “This section constitutes the exclusive judicial remedy 
for testing the right to hold an elective office as the result of an alleged irregularity, 
defect or mistake committed during the voting or canvassing process.”340 This 
limitation necessarily raises the question, is appeal permitted to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court as in a normal case, or does the statute give the court of appeals the 
final say on the matter? This could potentially be an issue itself in a contested 
election, especially if, as was the case in early 2011, the disputed election involves 
a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.341 Although news reports quoted the 
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board Director as understanding the law to 
allow an appeal to the state supreme court, presumably the candidate who wins at 
the Fourth District Court of Appeals would argue that the supreme court would lack 
jurisdiction over the case.342 This election was resolved based on the recount, 
however, meaning that the courts did not have to answer this question. 
Where an appeal is allowed, the scope of an appellate court’s review of a lower 
tribunal’s decision is usually quite limited.343 Generally, the appellate court will 
defer to the lower court’s findings of fact and will reverse the outcome only on 
questions of law.344 This rule exists because of the recognition that first-level actors 
have better ability to gather the facts, proximity to the events under review, and 
expertise in conducting and reviewing electoral outcomes.345 As the Ohio Supreme 
Court explained, 
[t]he test for reversing a decision of a board of elections is not 
necessarily whether this court agrees or disagrees with such decision, 
but it is whether the decision of the board of elections is procured by 
fraud or corruption, or whether there has been a flagrant 
misinterpretation of a statute or a clear disregard of legal provisions 
applicable thereto.346 
Thus, the lower-level court has a lot of power in shaping the scope of an election 
contest and the ultimate outcome. The appellate court will not reverse a lower court 
or administrative board’s findings of fact unless they are against the “manifest 
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weight of the evidence,” an admittedly high standard.347 “[T]he pivotal role of a 
reviewing court is to interpret the law in order to determine whether or not the trial 
court’s legal conclusion is against the manifest weight of the facts.”348 
For example, Louisiana explicitly prohibits a court from granting a new trial or 
rehearing, “but a court, upon its own motion, may correct manifest error to which 
its attention is called.”349 Thus, an appellate court can overturn a lower court’s 
decision only for “manifest error,” demonstrating a high level of deference to the 
trial court. By contrast, when an appeal is from a special election court comprised 
of members that the parties select (such as in West Virginia), the appellate court 
might have more leeway to “decide the matter in controversy, both as to the law 
and the evidence, as may seem to it to be just and right.”350 The statute gives 
broader authority to the West Virginia Supreme Court presumably because the 
lower tribunal did not necessarily include members of the judiciary, meaning that, 
in West Virginia’s view, there is less warrant for judicial-type deference to the 
special court’s decision. 
In sum, states that use their judiciaries to resolve election contests typically 
allow an appeal to a higher-level court, unless the case must originate with the 
state’s supreme court in the first place. Some states use their normal appellate 
procedure, while others expedite the process by skipping the intermediate court of 
appeals or including other procedural mechanisms. Moreover, many states limit the 
ability of the appellate court to overturn the decision, especially with regard to 
factual findings. 
III. REFORMING ELECTION CONTEST PROCEDURES: TIMING, STANDARDS, AND 
IMPARTIALITY  
The preceding discussion is mainly descriptive and analytical; we now know 
what types of laws are actually on the books with respect to election contests, and 
we understand what general characteristics these statutes embody. To achieve the 
value of robust, fair democracy, we must go one step further and identify what 
goals we should seek to elevate in promulgating procedures for resolving election 
contests. This Part discusses these goals and, recognizing that the most significant 
reform state election codes need is fostering impartiality in the decision maker, 
offers several potential models for creating an impartial election contest tribunal. 
A. Goals for Resolving Election Contests 
One of the starkest findings from the survey of state election contest statutes is 
that there is little consistency among the states. Instead, states have a myriad of 
methods for resolving election contests. These procedures vary even within the 
state, depending on the office.351 Many of these provisions, however, seem to be 
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relics of a prior time and merely remain on the books due to inertia.352 There 
appears to be no systematic adoption of state laws for resolving election disputes, 
suggesting that the variation among states may stem from the reality of local 
differences or the accident of history.  
Therefore, a beginning step for reform is to have states consider whether the 
dispute resolution systems currently in place make sense in today’s political 
climate. Anticipating post-election litigation has become a routine part of campaign 
strategy.353 Given this reality, states should evaluate whether the processes 
currently in place are the most appropriate for the inevitable election contests that 
will occur. Does it make sense to send the case to a single judge or a group of 
judges? Who should decide the case? How quickly must a tribunal render a 
decision? Should the provisions allow appeals? If nothing else, states should 
appoint a commission or undertake legislative initiatives to determine if the current 
procedures are consistent with the state’s goals in resolving post-election disputes: 
to quickly and accurately determine the winner in the most fair manner possible. 
Failure to do so will result in tumultuous election disputes occurring without clear 
guidance on the best procedure for deciding the contest. 
In analyzing the various forms of election contest provisions currently in effect, 
some trends are apparent. Scholars have opined on universal goals or values that 
should be inherent in any process for resolving disputed elections. One 
commentator broke these goals down into four parts: first, “to give effect to the will 
of the electorate” as a whole; second, “to give effect to the desire of the [individual] 
voter”; third, “to avoid upsetting the results of an election where possible”; and 
fourth, “to respect specific legislative commands.”354 Another formulation suggests 
that election contest procedures must vindicate the goals of “legitimacy” (which 
includes fairness, accuracy, and transparency), “finality and efficiency,” and “non-
politicization.”355 Other vital criteria for the proper decision maker include lack of 
bias, expertise in the substantive rules, and the ability to decide in a timely 
manner.356 Universal values⎯which often conflict—entail: “(1) fairness and 
legitimacy; (2) voter anonymity; (3) accuracy and transparency; (4) promptness and 
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finality; and (5) efficiency and cost.”357 Underscoring these ideals is the desire for 
impartiality in the decision maker.358  
Synthesizing these concepts, three overarching goals emerge: (1) resolving the 
election in a timely manner; (2) correctly and accurately determining the winner, 
which requires clear standards for a decision maker to follow; and (3) doing so 
through a tribunal that both is and is perceived as fair and just. These are the main 
values a state should promote in considering its election contest provisions. The 
remainder of this Article discusses ways to achieve these three goals, with a 
particular focus on the creation of an impartial tribunal. 
B. Improving Election Contest Processes 
1. Timeliness 
State statutes already address the first goal, timeliness, fairly robustly, albeit 
somewhat erratically.359 There are two aspects to timeliness: first, most states 
include a deadline by which a challenger may contest an election; and second, some 
states have adopted a date by which a tribunal must decide the case or at least offer 
guidance on how quickly a decision maker should rule.360 Most election contest 
provisions provide clear deadlines for when to file and at a minimum allow courts 
to move the case to the front of the docket, but there are variations. As noted above, 
some states provide mandatory deadlines, while other states are more aspirational 
in their timeliness language.361 Further, not all states have deadlines for when a 
challenger may contest an election,362 and the deadlines vary among the states.363  
In conducting a robust review of their election contest procedures, states should 
consider both aspects of the timeliness equation. States that do not include 
deadlines for filing a contest should follow the majority of states and adopt clear, 
mandatory timing requirements. Additionally, states should enact specific timing 
requirements that are binding on the decision maker. Aspirational timing 
guidelines, such as simply moving the case to the front of the docket, are 
insufficient to ensure prompt decision making. Strict deadlines help to promote 
quick finality, which is good for the legitimacy of the eventual winner and the 
process itself.364 Courts or other decision-making bodies can still make accurate 
decisions even when faced with a strict deadline. Further, the deadline can be 
dependent on the office in question and how quickly the office needs to be filled. 
For example, an election for a single executive might require faster resolution than 
an election for a multi-member body that can still function with a vacant seat.365 
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Moreover, a specially constituted tribunal for a specific election contest will likely 
need less time than a court that has a regular docket in addition to the pressing 
election case. 
Although states certainly can come up with their own deadlines, here is one 
proposal: first, states should require challengers to an election result to contest the 
election within three days of the certification. Challengers likely already have 
participated in the administrative recount, so they have been intimately involved in 
the post-election proceedings. It makes sense to give them a little bit of time to 
craft their legal pleadings even when time is of the essence, but three days seems 
sufficient. In addition, states should place deadlines on the tribunal deciding the 
case: if the election is for a single executive or office, the tribunal must decide the 
dispute within one week of when the new elected official is supposed to assume the 
position. Those who hold offices such as governor need time to prepare for the job, 
and the public needs finality, so a week seems about right—although, of course, the 
tribunal should try to decide the case even sooner. If the election is for a multi-
member body that can function without the seat being filled, then the tribunal can 
have some more time: perhaps it must decide within a month after someone was 
supposed to take office. States should not allow election contests to drag on, 
however, because that leaves constituents without someone to represent their 
interests. 
The point, of course, is not to mandate these specific deadlines on all states. 
Instead, the goal is to prompt states to enact deadlines that apply both to 
challengers and the decision maker so that the case is decided expeditiously. This 
will allow candidates to move on, government to run smoothly, and the public to 
have a sense of finality. Further, although the deadlines suggested here may seem 
tight, the adoption of clear standards and the creation of a separate tribunal, as 
discussed below, will help to temper these concerns because a single decision-
making body will serve solely to decide the case. In sum, states should revise their 
election contest codes to enact specific timeliness requirements for the resolution of 
these disputes. 
2. Clearer Standards 
Professor Huefner has already devoted significant attention to the second goal, 
providing guidelines for correctly and accurately determining the winner in a post-
election dispute. In his article, “Remedying Election Wrongs,” he urged states to 
define clearly  
procedural matters such as: (1) who can be a contestant; (2) what 
standard of evidence to require; and (3) how to expedite contests. 
[States should also consider] several fundamental issues that any 
[election contest] statute should address, in addition to specifying the 
acceptable reasons or grounds for a contest. These include: (1) whether 
and in what circumstances to permit proportional or statistical 
adjustment of election results; (2) how readily to permit new elections 
to occur; and (3) whether races for different kinds of offices deserve 
different approaches to these and other issues. Another crucial matter is 
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the extent to which primary elections ought (or need) to receive 
different treatment from general elections.366 
States would be wise to consider Professor Huefner’s proposed reforms, and, in 
particular, to provide greater clarity to decision makers regarding the appropriate 
evidentiary burdens on challengers and the permissible remedies for an election 
failure.367  
States can look to recent election contests to anticipate disputes over whether to 
count certain ballots,368 the standard for determining the “intent of the voter,”369 
and whether to require strict or substantial compliance with voting rules, such as 
casting an absentee370 or write-in vote,371 among others. Legislatures should 
consider the specific substantive rules the decision maker must use in resolving 
these kinds of issues, as well as the appropriate remedy should one of these 
problems arise. Crafting clearer guidelines would also eliminate the concern that 
partisan judges are deciding cases at their whim, as the standards would constrain 
their discretion.  
When the laws for resolving disputed elections are unclear, “judges are free to 
decide the case in accordance with their political preferences if they are so 
inclined.”372 This fact ties into the reason for needing clear substantive standards: 
granting biased election contest judges too much discretion is dangerous because it 
gives decision makers wiggle room to impose their partisan views. “[T]he 
conventional rules that most states use[] for adjudicating disputes over the counting 
of ballots [are] sufficiently malleable that judges prone to partisanship [can] easily 
manipulate those rules to support a decision for their favored candidate.”373 Thus, 
“[w]hen the existing law is insufficiently clear on how to resolve the election 
dispute . . . the law cannot constrain the courts, and judges are free to decide the 
case according to politics, as they often appear to do—especially when the election 
is a prominent one.”374 As Professor Huefner explains, 
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[E]lection contest provisions often provide courts with little substantive 
guidance for determining whether a remediable election failure in fact 
has occurred, and if so, how to remedy it. Instead, the focus of typical 
contest statutes is on the procedures for bringing a contest action. Many 
courts adjudicating election problems therefore have had to develop 
their own standards for deciding if an actionable failure has occurred 
and how to resolve it. The unsurprising result has been a variety of 
judicially developed tests for when courts will uphold, invalidate, call 
for a rerunning of, or themselves declare the winners of, a contested 
election.375 
The problem, of course, is that it is virtually impossible to create standards for 
every conceivable election failure. Even if we were to enact a robust list of 
potential election problems and how courts should resolve them, there will always 
be something new that throws a wrench in the administration of an election—which 
could potentially affect the result. This is why we also need a strong focus on who 
is making these decisions. The manner in which a state resolves a disputed election 
can impact the ultimate winner’s legitimacy.376 Thus, when a seemingly biased 
tribunal determines the winner of an election stemming from a previously 
unforeseen election problem, the loser—and the public—might think that the 
outcome was a result of the tribunal’s ideological skew. But the converse is also 
true: the more “neutral” the decision maker, the more secure we might feel in 
granting that tribunal some discretion in interpreting the laws to resolve the 
dispute—or at least in deciding the case when the substantive rules are not perfectly 
clear. Because the substantive guidelines are impossible to define specifically for 
every possible election failure, we need impartial decision makers so that, when 
they do inevitably use some discretion in resolving the dispute, it is not seen as 
merely a product of their partisanship. That is, there must be an additional 
structural protection in the composition of the election contest tribunal to ensure 
that the procedure of resolving a disputed election is as fair and unbiased as 
possible. 
3. Impartiality in the Decision Maker 
The third goal—impartiality—is where states need the most work. A significant 
feature missing from most states’ election contest provisions is a mechanism to 
ensure the impartiality of the tribunal. States that include some way of addressing 
bias in the decision maker—such as Pennsylvania, with its strange process of 
drawing names from boxes,377 or New Hampshire with its five-member Ballot Law 
Commission378—are outliers, and even those states do not completely balance or 
eliminate bias from the tribunal. Indeed, Pennsylvania virtually guarantees bias by 
giving authority to a randomly selected committee of the legislature that is likely to 
skew one way or the other, although the process for selecting the members 
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randomizes the direction of that skew. The more common approach is simply to 
send the case to some forum in the state judiciary without regard to rooting out any 
potential bias of those charged with resolving the dispute.379 
Ensuring impartiality is one of the most important attributes of achieving a fair 
decision-making process for election cases.380 The legitimacy of an election 
dispute’s outcome depends in large part on the impartiality of the tribunal that 
decides the case.381 Research suggests, however, that judges’ partisanship can 
influence their decisions when resolving election disputes.382 This taints the 
fairness in the tribunal’s resolution of the contest:  
When cases like these are dependent on the personal identity of the 
particular judges who happen to sit on the court at the time they are 
decided (as is true whenever a four-to-three, or a thre-to-two [sic], 
decision might have gone the other way with just one change in the 
composition of the court), the risk is that the outcome will depend on 
how many Democrats or how many Republicans hold those seats. 
While that risk exists in other kinds of cases, it is particularly acute in 
election contests. There is no point in letting the state’s supreme court, 
rather than its legislature, resolve the dispute over which candidate will 
become governor, if the court’s resolution will be just as politically 
motivated as the legislature’s.383 
As it stands, however, few states actually consider the ideology of the decision 
maker in their election contest provisions. Many states have detailed statutes for 
how to select who decides a disputed election, but there is little consideration for 
minimizing ideological decision makers in that process. Some states attempt to 
select a judge who will be “impartial” in the sense of not having a direct interest in 
the election: in Georgia, for example, the trial judge must come from a different 
circuit (but same district) as where the election took place.384 But this says nothing 
about the ideology of the judge deciding the case, which is particularly concerning 
given that the majority of states elect their judges. Indeed, judges who rely on 
voters for obtaining or keeping their jobs are inherently political actors—even if the 
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elections themselves are nonpartisan or retention elections—because judicial 
elections by their very nature require judges to engage with the political process. 
States that simply send an election contest to their judiciaries thus have a flawed 
process, because there is always the risk of a partisan taint. Even if the judges are 
perfectly fair, there still might be the perception of ideological bias, which 
ultimately affects the legitimacy of the resolution process and the declared 
winner.385 As Justice Breyer wrote in his Bush v. Gore dissent about the Electoral 
Commission that resolved the Hayes-Tilden presidential dispute, the Commission 
“simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining 
respect for the judicial process.”386 Thus, those states that ask their regular judges 
to decide a dispute, or who do not have a mechanism to ensure equal representation 
on the tribunal, should reform their procedural processes for election contests. The 
same goes for states that allow a single judge to decide the contest. There is too 
great of a risk in that setting that the outcome—or at least the public’s perception of 
the outcome—will turn on the identity of the judge who happens to hear the case. 
a. Proposed Solution: A Five-Member Panel with Two “Partisans” and Three 
“Neutrals” 
The solution to eradicating, or at least reducing, partisanship in election contest 
outcomes is to ensure that the tribunal deciding the case represents each side of the 
dispute.387 It will be virtually impossible to find truly impartial arbiters to comprise 
the entire election court; many people, including those that are appointed by a 
partisan executive or win an election for a judgeship, have political leanings that 
may be difficult to separate when making a ruling that will affect political power.388 
Thus, a decision-making body should include multiple individuals of different 
backgrounds and ideological viewpoints. Building in a bipartisan structure is the 
best way to ensure that the losing candidate cannot point to the ideological makeup 
of the tribunal as the reason for his or her loss.389 It also may be beneficial to 
include individuals with different backgrounds and expertise—such as judges, 
board of election officials, and election experts—to foster a diversity of viewpoints. 
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To address these problems, states should enact an election contest regime that 
(1) creates a multi-member panel of judges, political operatives, and experts who 
have different backgrounds and expertise to serve as an election contest tribunal; 
(2) gives an equal number of seats on the panel to those sympathetic to each 
candidate, while requiring candidates to identify these prospective members when 
they file their nominating petitions; (3) has the candidates or members of the panel 
together pick mutually agreed-upon “neutral” members for the tribunal, or requires 
a supermajority for any decision; and (4) denies the possibility of an appeal.390  
Two recent election disputes—one real, one hypothetical—demonstrate the 
efficacy of a multi-member body that includes “partisans” from each side. First, in 
the Minnesota Senate contest between Norm Coleman and Al Franken, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a three-judge district court to hear the case, 
which included one Democratic-leaning judge, one Republican-leaning judge, and 
one Independent judge, all from different parts of the state.391 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court actively sought to achieve partisan and geographic balance in the 
makeup of the court.392 This court was unanimous in its decision, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court easily affirmed, also unanimously.393 Second, in a 
simulated election contest based on the 2008 presidential election between Barack 
Obama and John McCain, Professor Foley created an election court to hear the 
case, comprised of one senior federal judge known to be more liberal, one former 
state supreme court justice known to be more conservative, and a third judge that 
the first two judges selected jointly, who happened to be a former federal judge and 
current law school dean.394 The court heard oral arguments from leading 
practitioners on each side and rendered a decision that ultimately would determine 
who won the presidency.395 Once again, the opinion in the mock case was 
unanimous.396 This suggests that when a court has an equal number of members 
“sympathetic” to each side, the partisanship of those judges cancels each other out 
and the court is able to render a decision devoid of partisan considerations. 
One problem with these approaches, however, is that having a three-member 
panel with only one moderate could leave the decision in the hands of that 
moderate judge. Although the two examples above produced unanimous opinions, 
that is not guaranteed through this structure. If judges are prone to ideological bias, 
then the court’s decision might often be two to one, with the moderate judge simply 
siding with one side or the other.  
Therefore, a better model would be to have a five-member panel, with one 
“partisan” that each side appoints and three “neutral” decision makers that the two 
partisans jointly select. Although a panel might work with seven or even nine 
                                                                                                             
 
 390. At this stage I am not advocating for a single, uniform procedure for all contests in 
all states, particularly because sustained scholarly attention to this issue is at its infancy.  But 
states should consider these structural guideposts in reforming their election contest 
provisions, which will be a significant improvement over the current ad hoc approach.   
 391. Foley, Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 12, at 146. 
 392. See id. 
 393. Id. at 161. 
 394. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 373, at 489–91. 
 395. Id. at 493–96. 
 396. Id. at 497. 
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members, five members seems to be the best size to ensure ease of administration 
and will allow the “partisan” members to have a significant, but not overwhelming, 
influence.397 To achieve diversity in expertise, at least two of the neutrals should be 
actual judges with significant judicial experience, and at least one neutral must be 
an expert in election administration. It is important for the tribunal to have both 
judicial and election expertise so it can resolve the complex issues that will arise. 
Having three neutrals allows the “moderate” decision makers to constitute a 
majority, thus lending credibility to the notion that any decision is not based on the 
ideological makeup of the court. The three moderate voices also can help to temper 
any preconceived partisanship one of the candidate-appointed judges might exhibit. 
To choose the two “partisan” judges, states should require candidates, when 
filing nominating papers, to identify a person they would like to be part of an 
election contest court, if needed. There would be no other limitations on whom a 
candidate may select, meaning that candidates can feel secure that the tribunal will 
include someone “on their side.” Selecting the “partisan” members of the tribunal 
before the election will help to remove the intense scrutiny that would accompany 
the choice in the heat of a post-election contest, potentially leading to less 
ideological picks. Of course, even these two candidate-selected members must take 
an oath to decide the case on the law and facts, not their loyalties to the candidate. 
These two people would then select the three “neutral” judges, ensuring that at least 
two have served in the judiciary for a set amount of time (such as the past five 
years) and one is an expert in election administration. It makes sense to have the 
candidate-nominated members select their “neutral” colleagues, as it will be easier 
for them to choose moderate individuals and reach compromise given that they 
must work together with these people on the panel. None of the “neutrals” may 
hold elective office (besides judge) or have any ties (including making 
contributions) to either campaign. The partisan members should be admonished 
that they may not “trade” selections, with each picking another partisan, but instead 
should endeavor to pick three truly neutral voices. The tribunal’s decision should 
be final: given clearer standards and an impartial makeup, an appellate round will 
not add anything to this process and could contribute to the sense that the 
membership of the particular tribunal is what drives the decision.398 
In sum, borrowing from and improving upon the models previously used that 
have exhibited impartial decision making in election contests, states should enact 
legislation that authorizes the creation of a special five-member election tribunal 
                                                                                                             
 
 397. Indeed, a seven- or nine-member panel might dilute the influence of each side’s 
single “partisan” member too much. Having each side appoint more than one “partisan” 
member of the panel might create too much administrative burden, especially when these 
additional people must jointly select the neutral members. 
 398. Cf. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster, supra note 365, at 191 (making a similar point 
with respect to presidential elections). It still makes sense for pre-election litigation, or 
regular lawsuits about election administration, to have multiple levels of review so that the 
legal system can deliberate appropriately on the proper interpretation of an election statute.  
See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 63, at 450–51. Election contests are 
different, however, because they occur immediately after the election and are about which 
candidate actually won.  In this context, states are wise to enact unique rules tailored to this 
kind of dispute, including limiting the number of appeals to achieve the fastest resolution 
possible. 
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for post-election contests. The methods of selecting the members of the tribunal—
with each side appointing one person and those two picking the three “neutrals”—
ensures that, at least procedurally, the tribunal’s resolution of the contest will be as 
impartial as practicable. 
b. Other Potential Ways to Achieve Impartiality 
Although the five-member tribunal described above is well-suited to meet the 
goal of impartiality, there are certainly other ways for states to minimize bias in the 
decision maker of an election contest. Professor Foley, with a plan similar to the 
five-member tribunal, advocates for the creation of a specialized election court to 
resolve election contests, comprised of two Democratic-leaning judges, two 
Republican-leaning judges, and a fifth non-judicial member chosen by mutual 
agreement of the other four.399 This type of body “would represent a balanced blend 
of law and politics.”400 As mentioned above, however, having four partisans on a 
five-member panel likely would make the non-judicial member the tiebreaking 
vote, vesting too much power in one person to resolve the contest. An advantage of 
the five-member court this Article proposes is that it allows for the inclusion of 
more non-judicial members (although still ensuring a judicial presence), more 
moderate voices, and at least one neutral election expert. 
New Hampshire’s and West Virginia’s systems of choosing the tribunal are also 
good models, although they need some tweaking. Recall that in New Hampshire, a 
Ballot Law Commission—comprised of two members the house of representatives 
selects (each major party chooses a member), two members the senate selects 
(again, one from each party), and one member the governor appoints—resolves 
most disputed elections.401 Further, none of the Ballot Law Commission members 
may be an elected official, and the governor must choose a person with experience 
in election procedure.402 West Virginia uses a special court for judicial election 
contests, comprised of one person that the contestee selects, a second person that 
the contestant chooses, and a third person that the governor appoints.403 Both of 
these systems guarantee that each side to the contest has sympathetic decision 
makers on the panel. They suffer, however, from the concern that the final member 
of the body, whom the governor appoints, will skew the body toward a partisan 
imbalance. A better solution would be either to have a mutually agreed upon person 
fill the last spot or to require a supermajority vote for any decision. For example, if 
a state wanted to copy New Hampshire’s five-member Ballot Law Commission 
(with the governor selecting the fifth member), it should also require four votes for 
any effective decision, thus necessitating at least one “crossover” vote for a 
resolution of the contest. There would also have to be unpalatable consequences in 
the event of a deadlock, such as the replacement of the members of the 
Commission. Another idea is to require unanimous consent for the appointment of 
                                                                                                             
 
 399. See Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 378–79. 
 400. Id. at 379. 
 401. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:1, :8(II) (2008). 
 402. § 665:1. 
 403. W. VA. CODE § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
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the members of the election contest tribunal from a body that encompasses several 
political viewpoints, such as the state supreme court in many states.404 
States could also have a list of eligible people who can hear a dispute (using 
criteria that demonstrates their neutrality), and the litigants could alternately strike 
members of the list until there are a set number to hear the case. States could 
further look to the rise of independent redistricting commissions for drawing 
legislative maps as an analogy of how to create a partisan-balanced body to decide 
disputes.405  
Regardless of how states do it, the key point is that states have not thought much 
about how to root out partisanship in their election contest procedures. This is one 
significant reform that will improve the process of resolving disputed elections. 
Moreover, states should consider how to eliminate bias in the decision maker for 
every type of election. New Hampshire and West Virginia use the processes 
discussed above for only certain elections. But there is no reason to limit the goal 
of impartial decision making only to some elected offices. States should evaluate 
their election contest provisions as a whole to decide who best can resolve post-
election disputes. 
There is an argument, of course, that partisanship should actually be part of the 
resolution process. Legislatures resolve election contests for their own members, 
and there is no suggestion that legislatures must do so impartially. If a legislature 
acts unfairly, the theory goes, the electorate can vote against the incumbents the 
next time around.406 The flaw in this reasoning is that election contests are not 
about which candidate is the best person politically to serve in the position; they are 
instead about whether particular votes should count or whether there was an error 
in the election process.407 These disputes, although about a political office, are 
nonpolitical in nature. They are about compliance with the state’s electoral code. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to leave the resolution of these elections solely to 
political actors. Additionally, voters are highly unlikely to vote in a subsequent 
election based on how their representatives voted in an election contest, particularly 
if that contest involves a member from a different part of the state. Although most 
legislatures have the power to resolve contests regarding their own members as part 
of their own sovereignty, it might be wiser to follow Hawaii and North Dakota and 
allow some form of review for election contests for state legislators.408 
To be sure, states need not adopt the highly detailed Pennsylvania mechanism 
for resolving disputed gubernatorial elections—in which members of the legislature 
are selected randomly through successive drawing of names from boxes to serve on 
                                                                                                             
 
 404. See Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster, supra note 365, at 200. 
 405. See, e.g., J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need For State Redistricting 
Reform To Rein In Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 556–58 (2011) 
(“State-level redistricting reform, particularly in the form of independent redistricting 
commissions, is absolutely necessary in order to fulfill the promise of government for the 
people, by the people.”) (emphasis in original). 
 406. See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 569–70 (1996). 
 407. See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 21, at 270 (“Ultimately, in many close elections the 
real fight therefore is not over whether to conduct a recount, but rather over which ballots to 
count.”) (emphasis in original). 
 408. See supra note 29. This would require a constitutional amendment in many states. 
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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the tribunal—to achieve partisan balance.409 In fact, that method likely would 
create an ideological imbalance through the random selection process if one party 
happens to have more names pulled than the other. States should nonetheless 
consider how best to create an ideologically-neutral arbiter of election disputes. 
Using a model discussed above, such as creating a five-member tribunal with three 
“neutral” members and a diversity of expertise, is a good place to start.410 
One final point is worth mentioning. States must promulgate procedural 
guidelines for an election contest before it occurs; trying to create a system in the 
middle of an actual dispute will be impossible given the stakes involved. It can also 
lead to concerns of partisanship infecting the procedural rules selected and 
therefore the ultimate outcome. Indeed, the post-election creation of the Electoral 
Commission to resolve the Hayes-Tilden 1876 presidential dispute was itself 
contentious, mostly because Congress was reacting to a current controversy in the 
context of each side seeking a mechanism that would be most advantageous to its 
candidate.411 Specifying ex ante the specific procedural rules for resolving election 
contests can eliminate or at least reduce judicial discretion ahead of time and will 
therefore help to create some stability when disputes arise.412 
Of course, none of this is to suggest that we should encourage post-election 
judicial proceedings. It is much better if states can reform their electoral codes so as 
to avoid post-election battles.413 But perfection in election processes is 
unrealistic.414 Therefore, states should carefully consider the manner in which they 
resolve election contests and, in particular, who should decide the dispute. Clarity 
and precision in procedural rules can help to ensure that the election contest process 
will reveal the candidate who actually received the greater number of valid votes. 
                                                                                                             
 
 409. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3312–30 (2007). 
 410. There is a secondary problem that also warrants attention: now that we know which 
reforms are needed, how do we convince state legislatures—who necessarily won their seats 
under the current regime—to change the current processes on the books? See, e.g., Heather 
K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2010) (noting that because “foxes are guarding the henhouse . . . we have to 
do something more than appeal to self-interested political actors to ignore their self-interest. 
We need to realign the incentives of the foxes with those of the hens, to redirect competitive 
political energies into healthier channels.”). Hopefully, the recognition that a failure to 
consider carefully a state’s post-election mechanisms might lead to electoral meltdown will 
spur legislators to act.  
 411. See Nagle, supra note 233, at 1744–45. 
 412. See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 68 (“In the post-2000 
debate regarding whether strict or lenient enforcement of election rules is preferable, it has 
become widely acknowledged that it is better, where possible, to sidestep this debate about 
‘general principles’ by relying on specific provisions of state law that address the situation. 
Thus, scholars urge states to take legislative positions on the debate between strict and 
lenient enforcement, spelling out their own state-specific resolutions of this debate in as 
much detail as they can.”). 
 413. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 289. 
 414. See Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 351. 
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CONCLUSION 
States should actively pay attention to the dispute resolution mechanisms in their 
statutory codes. The analysis of current state election contest provisions suggests 
three main reforms for states to consider as a starting point in revamping their 
procedures. First, states should include mandatory timing requirements both for 
litigants contesting an election and tribunals deciding the cases. Second, states 
should adopt clear guidelines on how to address the substantive issues that are most 
likely to arise in a post-election dispute. Finally, states should consider how, in 
reforming their election contest statutes, they should handle the reality of ideology 
infiltrating the decision-making process. In doing so, they should create 
mechanisms to appoint a neutral, or at least ideologically balanced, decision maker.  
These proposals are simply a starting place for reform. As noted above, planning 
for post-election litigation has become a routine part of a candidate’s campaign 
strategy. Given this reality, states would be wise to take a comprehensive look at 
their election contest procedures, as they no doubt will be invoked more often in 
the future. One needed reform involves a close examination of who should decide 
the dispute, but there are many other aspects for states to rethink. These include, 
among others, identifying who has standing to bring a challenge, the evidentiary 
burdens on a challenger, the substantive rules to invoke, and the possible remedies. 
To the extent the current statutes address them at all, states are widely divergent on 
all of these characteristics of their election contest provisions. It is time for states to 
consider the procedural aspects of their election contest statutes so as to ensure a 
post-election process that will reveal, in the fastest, most accurate, and fairest way 
possible, the true winner of the election. 
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 415. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 51 (state legislature); ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis 
2007) (governor); § 17-16-50 (state legislature); §§ 17-16-54, -65 (state judge); § 17-16-40 
(congressional election and presidential electors). 
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 416. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12 (state legislature); ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.540 (2010) 
(grounds for election contest); § 15.20.550 (jurisdiction and time for contest); § 15.20.560 
(providing for judgment of the court).  
 417. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 8 (state legislature); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672 
(2006) (“election of any person declared elected to a state office”); see § 16-676 (outlining 
the responsibilities of the trial court but not mentioning any mechanism for appeal from its 
decision). 
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 418. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801 (2011) (right of action “in any election”); § 7-5-801(b) 
(U.S. Senate); § 7-5-805(a) (state senate); § 7-5-805(b) (state house of representatives); § 7-
5-806 (governor); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(4) (appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court). 
 419. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (state legislature); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16400, 16200 (West 
2003) (all offices except state legislature); § 16900 (appeals). 
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 420. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 10 (state legislature); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-11-205 to 
-207 (West 2009) (governor); § 1-11-208(1) (state legislature); § 1-11-201(1) (state judge 
and congressional election); § 1-11-204 (presidential electors). 
 421. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); CONN. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–4 (judicial 
appointments); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (congressional 
elections and presidential electors); § 9-324 (governor and probate judges); § 9-325 
(appeals). 
 422. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state legislature); DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4 (governor); DEL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3 (judicial appointments); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5901–07 (2007) 
(state legislature); §§ 5921–28 (presidential electors); §§ 5941, 5950 (other offices).  
 423. D.C. CODE § 1-1001.11(b)(1) (2011) (granting District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals authority to review election results, including “initiative, referendum, and recall 
measures as well as elections for a particular office”). 
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 424. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2 (state legislature); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 2008 
& Supp. 2012) (circuit court is contest court for all elections but legislature); § 102.1685 
(venue either in county where contestant qualified or Leon County); § 102.171 (contest of 
election to legislature). 
 425. GA. CONST. art. III, § 4, para. 7 (state legislature); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-521, -523 
(2008) (governing election contests in the trial court); § 21-2-528 (treating appellate review 
of election contests as in other civil cases). 
62 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1 
 










confers the power 
to decide state 
legislative election 
contests to each 
house of the 
legislature, but the 
Hawaii Supreme 
Court declared 



































(statute applies to 
“any public 
office”) 












                                                                                                             
 
 426. HAW. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (appointment of state judges); HAW. CONST. art. 3, § 12 
(state legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-171 to -175 (West 2008) (any election); Akizaki 
v. Fong, 461 P.2d 221, 223 (Haw. 1969) (state legislature). 
 427. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34–2001 (2001) 
(congressional election and presidential electors); § 34–2004 (state judge); § 34–2104 
(governor); § 34–2105 (state legislature). 
 428. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a 
(West 2010) (governor); 5/23-13, -17 (state legislature); 5/23-3 (state judges). 
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 429. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (state legislature); IND. CONST. art. V, § 6 (governor); IND. 
CODE § 3-12-10-4(b) (2005) (governor, state legislature, congressional election, and 
presidential electors); § 3-12-10-18 (state judges); § 3-12-11-19.5 (presidential electors); § 3-
12-11-21 (state legislature). 
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 430. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 58.1–.7 (West 
2012) (governor and appeals); §§ 59.1–.7 (state legislature); §§ 61.1, .12 (statewide judges 
and appeals); §§ 62.1A, .20 (county judges and appeals); §§ 60.1, .6 (congressional 
elections, presidential electors, and appeals). 
 431. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state legislature); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000) 
(governor); § 25-1451 (state legislature); § 25-1437 (state judge and presidential electors); 
§ 25-1435 (congressional election). 
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 432. KY. CONST. § 38 (state legislature); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (LexisNexis 
2004) (state judge, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 120.175 (appeals); 
§ 120.205 (governor); § 120.215 (state legislature). 
 433. LA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1401–15 
(2012) (other offices). 
 434. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 3 (state legislature); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1–3, 
157 (2008 and Supp. 2011) (appointed judiciary); id. tit. 21-A, § 737-A(10) (all elections 
except state legislature). 
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 435. MD. CONST. art. III, § 19 (state legislature); MD. CONST. art. II, § 4 (governor); MD. 
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2010) (state judge, congressional election, and 
presidential electors). 
 436. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. X, (house); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. IV 
(senate); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. IX (appointed judiciary); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
55, § 35 (LexisNexis 2001) (inquest); ch. 56, § 59 (superior court and supreme court 
jurisdiction). 
 437. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 16 (state legislature); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501 
(West 1996) (quo warranto). 
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Minnesota438 File in Ramsey 
County; chief 





to the supreme 
court 
Trial court makes 
initial decision, 
with appeal 
allowed to the 
Minnesota 
Supreme Court; 
the decision is sent 





and court of 
appeals: chief 














to the court of 
appeals 
Senate: chief 









court in which 
contestee resides; 
appeal to the 
court of appeals  
File in Ramsey 
County; chief 




appeal directly to 
the supreme 
court  










to “any office 




applies to “any 





applies to “any 
office in any 
county”) 
                                                                                                             
 
 438. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); MINN. STAT. § 209.021 (West 2009) 
(venue for statewide offices, including governor and presidential electors); § 209.045 
(appointment of three-judge court for contests over statewide elections); § 209.12 
(congressional elections); § 209.10 (appeals from three-judge court for statewide contests); 
§ 209.09 (appeals from district court for local contests). 
 439. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 140 (governor); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 38 (state legislature); 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-955 (West 2003) (state legislature); § 23-15-951 (state judge, 
congressional election, and presidential electors). 
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Circuit court of 
any circuit in 
which any or all 
of the election 
was held; appeal 
as in other civil 
cases (statute 





judge may take 
evidence 
                                                                                                             
 
 440. MO. CONST. art. III, § 18 (state legislature); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.555 (West 2006) 
(governor); § 115.563 (state legislature); §§ 115.555, .561, .575(1) (state judge); 
§§115.575(2), .597 (congressional election); § 128.100 (presidential electors). 
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Montana441 District court of 



















of the county 

















District court of 




acceptance of the 
person’s 
nomination is 




(statute applies to 
“any person” for 
“any nomination 
or election”) 
District court of 




acceptance of the 
person’s 
nomination is 




(statute applies to 
“any person” for 
“any nomination 
or election”) 
Nebraska442 Trial court 
(Lancaster 
County); appeal 




Not included in 
the list of 
contestable 
offices 
Not included in 
the list of 
contestable 
offices 
Not included in 
the list of 
contestable 
offices 




























                                                                                                             
 
 441. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10 (state legislature); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-36-101 to -
103 (2011) (“any . . . election”). 
 442. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10 (state legislature); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102 
(LexisNexis 2008) (governor); § 32-1117 (appeals). 
 443. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.407 
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Speaker of the 
House and 




from each major 
party), and the 
governor selects 
the last person, 




appeal to the 
supreme court, 
but issues of fact 
are “final if 







Speaker of the 
House and 
President of the 
Senate each select 
two members (one 
from each major 
party), and the 
governor selects 
the last person, 














Speaker of the 
House and 




from each major 
party), and the 
governor selects 
the last person, 









Speaker of the 
House and 




from each major 
party), and the 
governor selects 
the last person, 




appeal to the 
supreme court, 
but issues of fact 
are “final if 
supported by the 
requisite 
evidence” 
                                                                                                             
(LexisNexis 2008) (congressional election and presidential electors); §§ 293.425, .427 (state 
legislature); § 293.430 (governor and justice of the supreme court). 
 444. N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 22, 35 (state legislature); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 46 
(appointed judiciary); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I) (2008) (governor, congressional 
election, and presidential electors); § 665:16 (2008) (appeals); § 665:8(II) (state legislature). 
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New Jersey445 Judge of the 
superior court 
assigned by the 
chief justice of 
the supreme 






“voted for by the 
voters of the 
entire State or 






Judge of the 
superior court 
assigned by the 
chief justice of 
the supreme 




(statute applies to 
elections “voted 
for by the voters 
of the entire 
State or more 
than 1 county 
thereof”) 
Judge of the 
superior court 
assigned by the 
chief justice of 
the supreme 




(statute applies to 
elections “voted 
for by the voters 
of the entire 
State or more 
than 1 county 
thereof”) 
New Mexico446 District court 
where either of 
the parties 
resides; appeal 
to supreme court 
(statute applies 









applies to “an 
election”) 
District court 
where either of 
the parties 
resides; appeal to 
supreme court 
(statute applies to 
“an election”) 
District court 
where either of 
the parties 
resides; appeal to 
supreme court 
(statute applies to 
“an election”)  
New York447 Quo warranto Legislature 
(respective house) 





                                                                                                             
 
 445. N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 4, ¶ 2 (state legislature); N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, ¶ 1 (appointed 
judiciary); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29–2 (West 1999) (governor, congressional election, and 
presidential electors). 
 446. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003) 
(“an election”); § 1-14-5 (appeals). 
 447. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b (McKinney 
2010) (quo warranto). 
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appeal to the 




Court of Wake 
County (statute 







Article III of 
the state 
constitution) 
County board of 
elections; appeal 
to the state board 
of elections; 
further appeal to 
Superior Court 
of Wake County 







Article III of the 
state 
constitution) 
County board of 
elections; appeal 
to the state board 
of elections; 
further appeal to 
Superior Court 
of Wake County 







Article III of the 
state 
constitution) 





to the supreme 
court (statute 
applies to “an 
election”) 









contest in the 
respective house 





to the supreme 
court (statute 
applies to “an 
election”) 




directly to the 
supreme court 
(statute applies to 
“an election”) 




directly to the 
supreme court 
(statute applies to 
“an election”) 
(presumably the 
“contestee” is the 
presidential 
elector) 
                                                                                                             
 
 448. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 20 (state legislature); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-182.13A 
(West 2007) (governor and state legislature); §§ 163-182.10–.11, .14(b) (state judge, 
congressional election, and presidential electors). 
 449. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-04 (2009) (“an election”); § 16.1-16-09 (appeals); 
§ 16.1-16-10 (legislative contests determined by courts and not by either house of the 
legislative assembly). 
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Ohio450 Chief justice of 






to “an office” 
voted on by 
“entire state”) 
Court of Common 
Pleas conducts an 
inquiry and 
forwards “all 
testimony and all 
evidence adduced” 




















judges:  court 
of appeals 
decides, with 












                                                                                                             
 
 450. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6 (state legislature); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B) 
(LexisNexis 2012) (statewide offices); § 3515.14 (state legislative positions); § 3515.08(B) 
(supreme court, court of appeals, and chief justice); § 3515.08(C) (other judicial elections); § 
3515.15 (appeal to supreme court); § 3515.08(A) (all federal positions). 
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Oklahoma451 Contest alleging 
fraud or 
irregularity may 
be filed with the 
state election 
board, and the 
case is heard by 
the district court 
judge of the 
county where 
the alleged fraud 
or irregularity 
occurred, or if 
the fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred in 














may be filed 
with the state 
election board, 
and the case is 
heard by the 
district court 





occurred, or if 
the fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred in 












be filed with the 
state election 
board, and the 
case is heard by 
the district court 
judge of the 
county where the 
alleged fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred, or if 
the fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred in more 
than one county, 










be filed with the 
state election 
board, and the 
case is heard by 
the district court 
judge of the 
county where the 
alleged fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred, or if 
the fraud or 
irregularity 
occurred in more 
than one county, 





applies to “an 
election”) 
                                                                                                             
 
 451. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 6 (state legislature); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 8-109 (West 
1997) (“Time for filing contest—Contests alleging irregularities or fraud”); § 8-118 
(“Election contested due to fraud or other irregularity”); § 8-119 (“Petition alleging fraud—
Procedure”); § 8-120 (“Petition alleging irregularities—Procedure”); § 8-121.1 (“Hearings 
on petitions alleging irregularities or fraud involving two or more counties”); § 8-122 
(“Determination of successful party impossible—Procedure—Governor to call special 
election”). 
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Oregon452 Circuit Court for 
Marion County; 
appeal to the 
court of appeals 




but a statute also 
gives jurisdiction 
to a circuit court; 











court 	  	  
Appeal to the 
court of 
appeals as in 
other civil 
cases	  
Circuit Court for 
Marion County; 
appeal to the 
court of appeals 
as in other civil 
cases 
Circuit Court for 
Marion County 
court; appeal to 
the court of 
appeals as in 




Trial court makes 
initial 
determination; 











judge court of 
“president 
judges” of the 
court of common 
pleas  
 
House: court of 
common pleas of 
the county in 
which the winner 
resides 
Special court 
with the “two 
nearest president 
judges” 
                                                                                                             
 
 452. OR. CONST. art. IV § 11 (state legislature); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036 (2011) 
(governor, state judge, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 258.085 
(appeals). 
 453. PA. CONST. art. II, § 9 (state legislature); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3312 (West 
2007) (governor); §§ 3401, 3407 (state legislature); §§ 3351, 3376–77 (state judges); 
§§ 3401, 3405 (congressional election); § 3351 (presidential electors). 
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writ of certiorari 




case law (statute 










writ of certiorari 




case law (statute 
applies to “an 
election”) 




writ of certiorari 




case law (statute 








on writ of 
certiorari 
(statute applies 
to elections for 
“federal officers, 
state officers, 
members of the 
State Senate and 















Board of state 
canvassers; 
appeal to 
supreme court on 
writ of certiorari 




members of the 
State Senate and 







Board of state 
canvassers; 
appeal to 
supreme court on 
writ of certiorari 




members of the 
State Senate and 







                                                                                                             
 
 454. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (state legislature); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(11) (2003) 
(state board of elections); Van Daam v. DiPrete, 560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1989) (holding that 
the decision of the board of elections is “final and subject to review only by a petition for 
certiorari filed in this court”). 
 455. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 (state legislature); S.C. CONST. art. V §§ 3, 8, 13 (judiciary 
appointed by general assembly); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (Supp. 2011) (governor, state 
legislature, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 7-17-270 (appeals). 
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South Dakota456 Supreme court 
(statute applies 
to “state offices 
or judicial 


























appeal as in 
other civil 
cases 




the election or 
some part thereof 
was conducted; 
appeal as in other 
civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“all other 
contests” that do 
not go straight to 
supreme court) 




the election or 
some part thereof 
was conducted; 
appeal as in other 
civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“all other 
contests” that do 
not go straight to 
supreme court) 






comprised of 7 
house members 














assigned by the 

















composed of the 
governor, 
secretary of state, 
and the attorney 
general; no 
appeal 
                                                                                                             
 
 456. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004) 
(governor and supreme court justices); § 12-22-7(2) (state judges, congressional election, 
and presidential electors); § 12-22-25 (right to appeal contests involving state judges, 
congressional election, and presidential electors). 
 457. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 11 (state legislature); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-101, -106,  
-109, -116 (2003) (governor and appeals); § 2-17-102 (state legislature); § 2-17-101 
(chancellors and congressional elections); § 2-17-103 (presidential electors). 
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resides if it is 
within the 
territory 
covered by the 
election, or any 
county wholly 
or partly 
covered if no 
contestee 
resides in the 
county; appeal 









Utah459 District court of 




appeal as in 
other civil cases 
(statute applies 
to “election or 
nomination of 






of the county 
in which the 
complaining 
voter resides; 






any person to 
any public 
office”)	  
District court of 




appeal as in other 
civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“election or 
nomination of 
any person to 
any public 
office”)	  
District court of 




appeal as in other 
civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“election or 
nomination of 
any person to 
any public 
office”)	  
                                                                                                             
 
 458. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 8 (state legislature); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 
2010) (congressional election); § 221.002(b) (governor); § 221.002(c)–(d) (state legislature); 
§ 221.002(e) (presidential electors); § 221.002(f) (appeals); § 231.004 (disqualification of 
district court judge); § 232.006 (venue). 
 459. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 10 (state legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-4-402 to  
-403 (LexisNexis 2010) (governor, state judge, congressional election, and presidential 
electors); § 20A-4-406 (appeals). 
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Vermont460 Superior Court 
for Washington 
County; appeal 
to court of 
appeals as in 
other civil cases 
(statute applies 
to “any office, 










to court of 
appeals as in 
other civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“any office, other 






to court of 
appeals as in 
other civil cases 
(statute applies to 
“any office, other 
than for the 
general 
assembly”) 












decided in the 
Circuit Court in 
Richmond by a 
special court 
composed of the 
chief judge of the 





to the City of 
Richmond” who 
the chief justice 
of the Virginia 
Supreme Court 
appoints 
Circuit Court in 
Richmond by a 
special court 
composed of the 
chief judge of the 





to the City of 
Richmond” who 
the chief justice 
of the Virginia 
Supreme Court 
appoints 
                                                                                                             
 
 460. VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 14, 19 (state legislature); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32 (providing 
that the governor shall fill judicial vacancies); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2002 & Supp. 
2012) (“any office, other than for the general assembly”); §§ 2605–2606 (state legislature). 
 461. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (judiciary 
appointed by General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-804 (2011) (governor); §§ 24.2-805 
to -806 (congressional election and presidential electors). 
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Washington462 Any justice of 
the supreme 
court, judge of 
the court of 
appeals, or judge 




to the supreme 
court from a 
decision of the 
superior court; 
appeal from 











Any justice of 
the supreme 
court, judge of 
the court of 
appeals, or 





to the supreme 
court from a 













Any justice of 
the supreme 
court, judge of 
the court of 
appeals, or judge 




to the supreme 
court from a 
decision of the 
superior court; 
appeal from 
court of appeals 
if action initiated 
there unclear 
(statute applies to 
“any candidate,” 
“any election 
officer,” or “the 
election”) 
Any justice of 
the supreme 
court, judge of 
the court of 
appeals, or judge 




to the supreme 
court from a 
decision of the 
superior court; 
appeal from 
court of appeals 
if action initiated 
there unclear 
(statute applies to 
“any candidate,” 
“any election 
officer,” or “the 
election”) 
                                                                                                             
 
 462. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4 (executive offices); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state 
legislature); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005); § 29A.68.120 (describing 
the appeal period from the superior court); In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (Wash. 2006) 
(finding that, even though Washington’s Constitution confers power over election contests 
involving governor and other executive officers to the state legislature, § 29A.68 confers 
jurisdiction to the courts). 
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appeal to the 
supreme court 
Not included in 
the list of 
contestable 
offices 
Not included in 
the list of 
contestable 
offices 
Wisconsin464 Trial court; if 
election is in 
only one 
appellate 
district, appeal is 
to the court of 
appeals; if 
election spans 
more than one 
appellate 
district, appeal is 
to the 4th 









Trial court; if 




is to the court 
of appeals; if 
election spans 
more than one 
appellate 
district, appeal 









Trial court; if 
election is in 
only one 
appellate district, 
appeal is to the 
court of appeals; 
if election spans 
more than one 
appellate district, 







applies to “any 
election”)  
Trial court; if 
election is in 
only one 
appellate district, 
appeal is to the 
court of appeals; 
if election spans 
more than one 
appellate district, 







applies to “any 
election”)  
                                                                                                             
 
 463. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (state legislature); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-2 
(LexisNexis 2011) (governor); § 3-7-4 (state legislature); § 3-7-3 (state judge); §§ 3-7-1 to -9 
(congressional election and election of presidential electors not included in the list of 
contestable elections). 
 464. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.01 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2012) (“any election”); § 13.23 (state legislature). 
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Trial court; no 
guidance for 
appeal process 








                                                                                                             
 
 465. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 10 (state legislature); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-102 (2011) 
(governor, state judge, and congressional election); § 22-17-114 (presidential electors). 
